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Borich, Peter M.
The Tensional Nature of John Fowles: Existentialist and Moralist 
Thesis directed by Professor Frederick M. Holmes, Department of 
English, Lakehead University
The fiction of John Fowles is existential and moral. The primary 
function of the thesis is to examine the ways in which it is so. The first 
question the thesis explores is the relationship between the moral nature 
of the fictions and modern existentialism. Thinking about this question 
has traditionally revolved around the nature of freedom. Since Fowles’s 
fiction and existentialism both promote freedom, the moral nature of the 
fiction is often said to consist in always choosing more and better 
freedom. But Fowles’s freedom is a relative freedom. It Is a freedom that, 
paradoxically, places extreme limitations upon individuals. It is my 
contention that the alliance between modern existentialism and Fowles’s 
moralism is, in many ways, untenable.
The thesis proposes that we look for a new model and finds that 
model in the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus. In the thinking of 
Heraclitus we find not only a meaningful relationship between the 
existential and the moral, but a paradigm that can be seen to operate in 
the fictions. In order to illustrate my thesis, I will provide detailed 
discussions of The Collector. The Maous. and "The Ebony Tower."
All Fowles’s protagonists initiate a journey which, corresponding 
to the two impulses that inform them, the existential and the moral, has 
two movements: the first is an inward movement; the second is a  
movement outward. The Inward movement--in existentialist terms, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
pursuit of selfhood, In Jungian terms, individuation--is necessary before 
the protagonist can initiate the second stage. The second movement of 
the protagonist is a movement outward, a movement into community. 
Fowles’s successful protagonists make both movements; the 
unsuccessful protagonists fail to initiate the first movement, and therefore 
do not have the insight to move beyond themselves.
Once the protagonists are aware of both impulses, the existential 
and moral, they become aware that this new freedom must be 
excercised responsibly. They must learn to balance the self with the 
other. This is what John Fowles suggests we must all achieve: we must 
learn to create a living balance between self and society.
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1 V
Who am 1?
What are my duties to myself?
What are my duties towards others?
To what extent, given my capacities, do I fufill 
and balance these conflicting extremes?
John Fowles, The Aristos
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The present study has grown from the belief that John Fowles is, 
above all else, a moral artist. While this view is not unfamiliar in Fowles 
criticism, it seems to me that there have been very few studies that 
sufficiently explain the way in which his fiction is moral. The reasons for 
this state of affairs are many, but I believe one important reason is the 
inordinate amount of critical discussion devoted to his existential 
tendencies. In a century in which the meaning and significance of the 
word "moral"-in art as in other areas-has become associated with 
embarrassment and a quaint naïveté, and in which the intellectual milieu 
has been commanded by those soi-disant existentialists from the post­
war years whose reforming cry was freedom, freedom and ever more 
freedom, it is not surprising that Fowles should have been considered so 
overwhelmingly from this one vantage.
One goal of this thesis is to show the unique way in which the 
fictions are moral. By moral, however, I do not mean to imply that Fowles 
is moral in a narrow or prescriptive way. Instead, what we find reflected in 
his fiction is a broad concern with what constitutes a good life and 
satisfying relationships amongst people.
Even so, Fowles's philosophical maturation did coincide with post­
war existentialism, and any study that attempts seriously to discuss his 
influences must in some manner come to terms with this influence. My 
particular impression is that Fowles’s debt to modern existentialism 
should be seen as more emotional than doctrinal. My reason for thinking 
so is this: while Fowles does draw upon existentialist themes as they 
were articulated around the middle of this century, his solutions to the 
problems they raised are, in significant ways, different from those offered
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by many of this century's existentialist philosophers. Rather, Fowles 
draws his solutions to the problems raised by modern existentialism by 
harking back to an ancient pre-Socratic thinker, Heraclitus of Ephesus. 
This move is not so strange as it at first appears, especially when we 
consider that behind this century’s most distinguished existentialist 
voices, that is, behind the voices of Soren Kierkegarrd, Martin Heidegger, 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Jean-Paul Sartre, is the seminal voice of 
Heraclitus himself. This, then, is another goal of this thesis: to re­
evaluate the influence of Heraclitus.
As 1 have said, the view that Fowles is a moral writer is not entirely 
unfamiliar. In fact, some may consider it to be so evident that they will 
greet this statement with the same benevolently amused smile reserved 
for the man who claims, prophet-like, that the sun will rise tomorrow. But 
the question of the matter is, if this view is in fact so embarrassingly 
evident, w hy- in either the extant criticism or in the continual and what 
can only be called voluminous flow of criticism from the academy-is it so 
proportionately under-represented?
I believe that part of the reason for this state of affairs rests with 
Fowles himself. As have few other authors in recent times, Fowles has 
engaged himself in the critical discussion of his own work to a surprising 
degree. In fact, the only thing more surprising is the extent to which he 
has been responsible for the direction of much of that criticism. 
Throughout his publishing career he has given interviews and written 
prefaces and articles that have encouraged critics to see in his work 
myriad influences: among these, Jungian and Freudian psychology, 
biography, all manner of post-modern critical theories, and most 
importantly, contemporary existentialism. While much of this direction
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has been helpful, other comments-particulariy his comments leading in 
the direction of Sartre-have only succeeded in running critics too far 
down one path. Part of the blame must rest with critics themselves.
While there can be little doubt that Sartre figures into Fowles's beliefs, it 
should have been only too evident that much of Sartre's thinking is 
antithetical to a great deal of Fowles's thought. This issue has been 
Inadequately understood, and, I believe, there is a real need to re­
evaluate the earliest critical assumptions. In other words, we need to ask 
ourselves whether we have Fowles right. A look at the criticism 
surrounding the publication of Fowles’s first novel will serve to illustrate 
the need to ask this question.
It is now a notorious part of the Fowlesian critical legend that The 
Collector was initially so little understood that it was first reviewed as a 
thriller, and not, according to some, as an exceedingly good one at that. 
Although most of the "serious" critics saw that there was more to the 
novel, their humanistic sensibilities were nonetheless offended by what 
they saw as Fowles "crypto-fascism" In his treatment of Clegg and 
Miranda.
In the oft quoted preface to the 1968 edition of The Aristos. Fowles 
had to defend himself from the charge of elitism by explaining-as he 
would have to do often-what it was he was trying to do in his fiction.
"The principal theme in this book," he said, "as also in The Collector-h a s  
been similarly misunderstood. In essence it comes from a Greek 
philosopher, Heraclitus"(9). FovWes went on to explain that, indeed, the 
theme of The Collector was about the differences-moral and intellectual 
and not, as was supposed, class differences-between a thinking Few 
and an unthinking Many. But it was not, as so many thought, a fascist
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sentiment. The fact that the difference between the Few and the Many is 
"bioloaicailv irrefutable," does not, Fowles said, warrant the "jump from 
that to the conclusion that mankind can be split into two clearly defined 
groups, a Few that is excellent and a Many that is despicable." Rather, 
he said, "[tjhe gradations are infinite; and if you carry no other idea away 
from this book I hope you will understand what 1 mean when I say that the 
dividing line between the Few and the Many must run throuab_each 
individual, not between individuals" (9-10, the emphasis Is original).
With this we might have supposed that the critical train would realign 
itself and, regarding this issue, run smoothly thereafter.
In many ways, criticism has fared better since that time, and there 
have been many fine discussions. There can be no question that we 
now have a much better understanding of Fowles’s work than we did in 
those early days, when criticism seemed always to be one step behind 
the magus himself. But today, when criticism has traversed a long road 
and become more sophisticated, and when we find ourselves enmeshed 
in the sticky nets of semiotics, might we not ask the basic question again? 
How far have we got Fowles right?
It is my suggestion that In fact we have not heeded the advice 
given us by Fowles in the preface to The Aristos. This is evident iri-ihat, 
in spite of Fowles’s express mention of Heraclitus as the source of much 
of his thinking, and in spite of his caveat that we read his distinction 
between the Few and the Many In the proper spirit, we still have had no 
major discussion that sufficiently relates Heraclitus to Fowles. This has 
led to a state of affairs that has located Fowles's existential impulse 
almost exclusively in contemporary existentialism, and in doing so, has 
not provided sufficient context in which to understand Fowles's very
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strong moral impulse. Another consequence is that even today, we have 
no clear expression of the way the Few and the Many is played out in the 
fiction.
As the title of this study suggests, I feel that in the fiction of John 
Fowles there is an inherent tension: on the one hand, there is his overt 
existentialism; on the other, his morality, or what I will hereafter call his 
moral impulse. These two impulses, existential and moral, and the 
tension between them, are at the centre of almost all Fowles’s fiction, and 
will be seen as the foremost dynamic informing the three fictions that I 
have chosen to examine: The Collector, The. Magus , and "The Ebony 
Tower." While consideration of the limitations of space has restricted the 
number of fictions I can examine, I believe this approach would also be 
valid for other fictions by Fowles. The selection of the above three 
fictions, however, was far more within my power to determine, and there 
was a rationale behind their choosing.
For readers familiar with Fowles’s fictions, my choice of The 
Maous in light of my thesis should be clear enough. The long and, for 
Nicholas, tortuous path to enlightenment has seemingly been 
undertaken to bring him to one simple understanding: that he should find 
in Alison all he needs. That this is in many ways a moral understanding 
should not, I think, raise too many critical eyebrows. What may raise a 
few eyebrows is my decision to examine The Collector and "The Ebony 
Tower" from the same paradigm. Both fictions are generally seen to be 
anomalies, especially from the perspective of protagonists who 
successfully integrate and act upon their newly-acquired'insight. The full 
explanation of how these fictions do so must remain for the chapters to 
explore, except to say here that the fact that 1 felt these fictions conformed
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to the paradigm, and that this fact seemed to be almost completely 
unrepresented in the criticism, accounted for at least part of my 
motivation to include them in this study.
While it is true that in almost every story Fowles has written there is 
the movement of the protagonist into a new awareness of the self, what 
has not been equally expressed is that besides this inward movement, 
there is a movement outward: there is In the protagonist the growing 
understanding of the need to go beyond the self. In almost all of 
Fowles’s fiction there is this bi-directional movement: protagonists first 
inwardly learning the responsibilities to the self, and then, from this, 
learning the responsibilities beyond the self; first the existential impulse 
toward selfhood, then the moral impulse toward society. I see this as 
Fowles’s tensional nature: the tension between living as a fully authentic 
and responsible individual and balancing that individuality with one’s 
responsibility to the community. For Fowles, being human, living 
authentically, is the constant creative struggle to balance and harmonize 
these two impulses. It is the outward movement that, while never 
discussed as such, is almost certainly responsible for what critics have 
called Fowles’s moral outlook, in the parable of Plato's cave, just as 
those prisoners who have freed themselves (and are thus able to see 
more) must then descend back into the cave in order to share their 
knowledge with those who are still chained to their illusions, so too 
Fowles’s characters, having first been freed from their own illusions, must 
expend the moral effort to reconnect with their community. In the fictions 
that I discuss, this outward movement into community is most often seen 
as an expression of love. In The Collector, Miranda feels the need to 
love G.P. and the need to help Clegg, in The_Maaus. Nicholas feels the
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need to connect with Alison, and David of "The Ebony Tower" feels the 
need to honour the love for his wife.
The critic William Palmer was early aware of the moral impulse in 
Fowles's fiction. In his study The Fiction of John Fowles. he claims that in 
each of the novels "[t]he liberation of the self can only be accomplished 
by means of moral, human action in the outer world" (80). I would add to 
this one word; the M  liberation of the self, for it can be argued that all 
Fowles's characters have achieved some measure of self-knowledge or 
liberation before they look outward: without this initial insight, they would 
not have perceived the need to get beyond the self. In ignoring the 
relationship between the inner and outer dramas, Palmer does not 
sufficiently account for the moral Impulse.
Another critic who has written about Fowles and who has placed 
him within the moral tradition is John Gardner. In his book On Moral 
Fiction. Gardner sees the capacity to love as a yard-stick for moral art. 
"Great art," he says, "celebrates life's potential, offering a vision 
unmistakably and unsentimentally rooted in love" (83). He continues a 
little further on. "In art, morality and love are inextricably bound: we affirm 
what is good-for the characters in particular and for humanity in general- 
-because we care" (84). It is this capacity to love that Gardner sees in 
Fowles’s fiction. He quotes Fowles in Daniel Martin : "No true 
compassion without will, no true will without compassion" (84).
If Fowles has been praised by some for his serious moral 
approach, others have felt his didacticism to be a flaw. Bruce Bawer, in 
an article in the late 1980’s, "John Fowles and his Big Ideas", offers this 
judgement:
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If at times, then, his love of ideas seems an asset, at other 
times-namely, when he allows it to undermine his 
narrative, and to obscure his very considerable gifts for 
language and storytelling and his innate sense of human 
character-his philosophical promiscuity seems by far his 
greatest liability. (22)
While Bawer may quibble as to the correct balance, he must surely admit
that the "innate sense of human character" that we sense in all of
Fowles's novels has a very great deal to do with his deep commitment to
the ideas that are central to and that motivate his characters’ lives. This
seriousness of the writer's Intention was made explicit by Fowles in an
interview with Roy Newquist.
All good books are distilled experience.. . .  1 think the 
serious writer has to have his view of the purpose of 
literature clear. I don't see that you can write seriously 
without having a philosophy of both life and literature to 
back you. Some philosophy of life is a property of all better 
writers. (220)
Clearly, Fowles defends the need to write serious, didactic (and by this I 
interpret moral) fiction. This is as close as Fowles gets to championing 
the moral impulse outright. However, we need not look for direct 
statements from the author himself; we need only look to the fiction to find 
a clear and unambiguous purpose.
In a way, it is not surprising that few studies have attempted to deal 
with Fowles's moral impulse; for, while even the most casual 
acquaintance with the fiction yields unmistakenly the sense of a broader 
moral purpose, there remains the difficult issue of the nature of this 
morality, and its relation to his existentialism. If we accept the existential 
foundation of much of Fowles's thought, as indeed we must, we must 
also accept that its essential nature inheres in a thoroughgoing 
relativism. "Existentialism," as Fowles says in The Aristos. "is a theory of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I 0
relativity among theories of absolute truth" (123). But what kind of a 
world does a philosophic relativism create, and upon what do the values 
it holds to-providing it holds to some values-rest?
Aside from the lack of full explication of the relationship between 
the existential and the moral, there has existed another problem with the 
extant criticism. Ever since those earliest full-length studies that 
identified Fowles’s existential influences, there has been what one must 
suppose is a silent consensus that nothing more need be said. Yet there 
has been up to this point no overt recognition of the irreconcilability 
between some of the claimed existential influences, most notably Sartre, 
and the very strong moral current evident in the fictions.
Fowles's existential impulse has been more widely written on, 
and, I suspect, ostensibly better understood than his moral impulse.
Once again William Palmer was the earliest critic to have offered a 
protracted discussion of the existential influence. In his study, Palmer 
identifies Fowles's influences as deriving primarily from Sartre and 
Dostoyevsky. Two years later, in 1978, another full-length study 
appeared, Peter Wolfe's John Fowles: Maous and Moralist. Like Palmer, 
Wolfe too sees contemporary existentialism as the primary influence on 
Fowles, particularly the Sartrean school of existentialism. It was not until 
a few years later, with James Baker’s article, "Fowles and the Struggle of 
the English Aiistoi," that a critic tempered the enthusiasm to align 
Fowles with one particular voice in contemporary existentialism. "We 
have decided it is valid to call him an existentialist," said Baker. "While 
this designation does have a kind of functional accuracy in describing his 
philosophical posture, it is misleading if we take it to mean perfect
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alignment with or dependence upon any one school in that tradition” 
(164).
This is not to say that Sartre's influence is not present in the fiction. 
Fowles does echo Sartre in some ways, particularly on the theme of 
freedom. Fowles himself, moreover, has encouraged us to think along 
these lines. But as Baker implies, existentialism has many voices. This 
is Kurt Reinhardt's point as well when, in The Existentialist Revolt, he 
reminds us that "existentialism" is merely a new name applied to a kind of 
thinking that has been evident at various times throughout the long 
history of philosophical thought (22). It is therefore a puzzling fact that no 
major critical discussion exists concerning the Heraclitean influence-that 
is, beyond the mere mention of Heraclitus as Fowles's source for the 
ideas of hoi aristoi and hoipolloi, the Few and the Many, It is still 
further puzzling when we remember that it is Fowles himself who, in The 
Aristos. pointed to Heraclitus as the seminal influence on many of the 
ideas contained in that book.
1 contend that there is much to be gained by going back to 
Heraclitus to determine the full measure of his influence on Fowles. As 
mentioned above, one issue that will be reconciled-even if not fully 
understood as problematic at the present-is the over-insistence on 
Fowles’s relationship to contemporary existentialism, in particular, that of 
Sartre. By viewing Heraclitus in a "proto-existentialist" light, we will see 
that Fowles derives much more than the simple and oft-noted notion of 
the Few and the Many. We will see in Heraclitus's thinking the origin of 
many of Fowles's most central ideas: the conception of a universe ruled 
by chance, or hazard; ideas about counter-supporting and counter-poles; 
the importance of justice and equality; and the necessity to balance and
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harmonize the whole. But most significantly, we will see that Heraclitus's 
thinking is existentialist In the truest sense: the human being is at the 
center of his philosophic quest. Thus, we will free ourselves from the 
over-insistence upon contemporary existentialism by locating the source 
and character of many of Fowles's existentialist ideas in Heraclitus.
Yet the present study goes further. What is unique Is the 
identification and explication of Heraclitus's moral nature. In recovering 
this moral dimension in his thinking, we will see united in his thought the 
existential impulse and the moral impulse, and we will see that in him 
they are harmonized in a tensional unity. It is by looking more closely at 
Heraclitus that we will be able to see the way in which Fowles manages 
to be both an existentialist and a moralist.
We will not, however, see Fowles reproduce Heraclitean ideas 
slavishly. Though we will see that certain ideas in Fowles derive their 
essential character from Heraclitus, Fowles transmutes these ideas in 
order that they speak more clearly to a post-Darwinian world. Where we 
see both thinkers closest to each other is in their motive and method. 
Both Heraclitus and Fowles see humans beset by illusions that prevent 
them from leading richer lives, and both thinkers offer a pattern for living 
that will lead people to be more authentic and more humane.
The last issue that will be resolved-an issue perhaps small but 
equally unsounded-is the meaning behind an extraordinarily curious 
statement by Fowles in The Aristos . In that work Fowles says of his 
attitude to God: "I do not consider myself an atheist, yet this concept of 
'God' and our necessary masterlessness obliges me to behave in all 
public matters as if I were" (28).
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In its literal sense, atheism, from the Greek atheos , means 
"without God". What Fowles says then is that he is not "without God," but 
that outwardly, he must act as if he were. This raises two questions. 
Firstly, what can he mean by saying that he is not "without God" when 
part of The Aristos is a concerted effort to say that "God" does not exist; 
and secondly, why must he act as if he were "without God"? The 
answers to these questions only become obvious if we are aware of 
Fowles's Greek influence, and equally aware of the significance of such 
an influence. Heraclitus, living in a pre-Christian world, seeks to free his 
fellow citizens from a reliance upon the old Greek gods who prevent 
them from obtaining a consciousness of their own selfhood in relation to 
a larger cosmos. Fowles, living in a post-Christian world, seeks to do the 
same, only Fowles seeks to free his fellow citizens from a personal, 
Christian god. Yet in the same way that Heraclitus feels the need to 
acknowledge a purpose behind the cosmos, a purpose which he is both 
willing and unwilling to call by the name God (Fragment 32, Robinson), 
so too Fowles, although he must behave as though he were without 
"God," seems to imply that he believes in a purpose that he is both willing 
and unwilling to call God.
In recovering the existential, theological, and moral nature behind- 
Heraclitus’s thinking, we will be better able to understand both the 
existential and moral impulse in John Fowles's fiction. We will see that 
Heraclitus's philosophy preserves the spirit of individualism without 
losing the larger context in which increased individualism is made 
meaningful, -i
In a genuine sense, then, each fiction is a microcosm of the 
utopian adventure. How, via better individuals and better communities.
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will we achieve a better world? A full reading and understanding of 
Fowles's fiction unmistakably reveals his broadest aim as educative, thus 
resembling that of history’s greatest utopist, Plato-with this one all 
important difference. Where in the Republic Plato builds a better world 
upon the individual's knowledge of the absolute-the Platonic ideal- 
Fowles, beginning from the individual also, builds a better world from the 
foundation of existential relativity.
Finally, it is with some trepidation that anyone desiring to write 
upon John Fowles begins. Certainly the intellectualism that 
characterizes all Fowles's writing is demanding in its scope; but that must 
appear to the critic only as a challenge, not a menace. And certainly his 
avowed suspicion—if not dislike-of much effort that flows from the 
academy gives pause for thoughtful consideration. In the face of this, the 
critic must firmly believe his contribution valuable. But these concerns 
are not in themselves strong reasons to question the worth of the 
undertaking.
All critics, provided their aim be tme and honest, attempt to explain 
the work of art before them. Their business is to increase the 
understanding in the reader of the work of art itself. However, and in a 
thought that Fowles might even like, in order to say something about 
anything implies that we do not say something about many other things; 
that is, our very way of thinking, of communicating, necessitates that we 
choose to say one from among a possible many things. In this sense all 
acts of explanation are limiting at the same time that they are liberating. 
As a writer and thinker who is acutely aware of any kind of circumscribing 
force, Fowles presents an obvious caution.
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To make this clearer, let us look at Fowles's thoughts on mystery. 
As Fowles says in The Aristos , "Mystery, or unknowing, is energy. As 
soon as a mystery is explained, it ceases to be a source of energy. If we 
question deep enough there comes a point where answers, if answers 
could be given, would kiH"(28). To borrow a metaphor from Fowles, if we 
as critics (collectors) see Fowles and his work (a butterfly) merely as 
something to be pinned-down, limited, and ultimately explained (killed), 
we diminish the power of the work while at the same time violating a 
basic teaching of its author.
My purpose in this thesis is surely not to destroy any mystery there 
may be in Fowles's thinking while in the very act of trying to account for it. 
Though it is true that mystery is energy, it is also true that something is 
gained--an energy or power-through de-mystification. And as any good 
seeker knows, answers inevitably lead to further questions and more 
mystery.
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Chapter One: Pre-Socratic Parallels
Thinking well is the greatest excellence and wisdom: 
to act and speak what is true, perceiving things according to their
nature.
Thinking is shared by all.
Heraclitus, XXXII, XXXI
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 7
Before we can talk about the ways in which Fowles imports 
Heraclitus's thinking, we must first talk about Heraclitus. And before we 
can begin a discussion of the ideas and meaning of Heraclitus’s thought, 
we need to talk about the tradition to which he is responding-and in the 
very act of that response-transforming.
As with all philosophical writing before Plato, the original text of 
Heraclitus is lost. What we know of Heraclitus-and for that matter all the 
pre-Socratic philosophers-has come to us through a great many 
intervening authors in the form of quotations, paraphrases and reports.* 
Thus, it is impossible to know with absolute certainty what he thought, for 
we cannot know how much of the original we possess or fail to possess.
Another issue is the reliability of those who have preserved his 
teachings. This issue has shown itself to be the greatest obstacle to 
Heraclitus's philosophy, for his doctrine has been altered according to 
the bias of those who cite him. indeed, it has been the work of 
Heraclitean scholarship to separate the bias in previous sources and 
commentators from what genuinely can be said to be Heraclitus's own 
thought.
Still another obstacle, and this no doubt has contributed to the one 
above, is the highly paradoxical nature of Heraclitus's writing style. What 
follows from this is that Heraclitus’s thinking is very difficult to penetrate. 
This is particularly the case if we should try to examine his thinking from 
too small a number of fragments. As Kathleen Freeman has observed;
If then the original was difficult of interpretation to ancient 
readers, our own mutilated version is very much more so;
* My understanding of pre-Socratic philosophy has been drawn 
from many Greek scholars, among them Kathleen Freeman, 
Charles Kahn, T. M. Robinson, and especially Werner Jaeger.
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this must be read and reread many times in order to obtain 
even a dim conception of the whole. (108)
Consequently, while It is possible to extract from the surviving testimonia
views about specific areas of the thought, for example ideas about the
the Few and the Many, and about the logos, in doing so we inevitably
sacrifice the true nature of the thought, which is essentially organic and
unified. As with all Greek thinking, it is best to approach Heraclitus by
seeing the whole of his thought. It is therefore necessary-if we are to
recover not only the existential and moral aspects of his thinking, but the
true relation of hoi ahstoi to the hoi polloi as well-that we place as
much of his thinking as possible in the widest of contexts.
To that end, we must first situate Heraclitus in his own time, and 
see him as a bridge between two Important traditions. The first of these is 
the older, popular tradition of wisdom represented by the poets and 
sages of the early sixth century (Kahn 12). It is from this tradition that 
Heraclitus derives his oracular style and, as we will shortly see, the moral 
conception behind the good man, or hoi ahstoi. The other influence, 
without which the full fruition of his thinking could not have been 
possible, is that of the new scientific culture that was emerging around 
him. It was Heraclitus's special genius that he was able to unite these 
two traditions, and his ability to find unity in all things will be seen as 
central to all his thinking.
I will first explain the moral thinking present in the popular 
tradition, and in doing so I will discuss two Greek ideals. The first of 
these is the Greek ideal of areté , the ideal of human excellence held by 
the Greek citizen and preserved for us in the literature of the popular 
tradition.
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As both Jaeger and Kahn state, the conception of areté appears 
first for us in the poetry of Homer. Both commentators point to the same 
work to elucidate this notion. In The I Iliad (VI. 208), a father says to his 
son: "'Always be first and best, and ahead of everyone else"'(Kahn 12). 
As Kahn notes, this statement is striking in its unabashed call for 
individual preeminence (12). The ideal is most often realized by a 
warrior who achieves it through some combination of physical prowess, 
heroic valour and courage. Significantly, the Ideal in its earliest stage is 
understood almost exclusively as something to be won through action. In 
other words, this conception of excellence lacks any notion of intellectual 
or moral excellence. According to Homeric a re té , an action is judged 
wrong, shameful or foolish only if it leads to failure in the projects of the 
agent (12).
But, as with any Greek ideal, areté could not and did not .remain 
static over time. As the poets of a newer spirit emerged, newer ideas of 
what constituted human perfection required that the old notion of areté 
be enlarged, to include, along with nobility of action, nobility of mind 
(Jaeger, Theology 8). This is the spirit behind the ancient dictum, "be 
both a speaker of words and a doer of deeds." In the widening of this 
ideal, we can see a distinction between "the 'competitive' excellences 
and other more 'quiet' or 'cooperative' virtues" (Kahn 13). In this newer 
notion of areté , there is what can be described as an opposition between 
between virtues of "achievement" and those of "restraint", or, variously, a 
tension between individual and social values (13).
The other Greek ideal we need to be aware of is sophrosyne. 
Sophrosyne, an ideal behind the utterances of the Seven Sages, had 
originally the meaning of "good sense" or "soundness of mind" (13). Just
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 0
as with the ideal of areté , it was originally understood in relation to 
practical action and was equally free from any moral considerations. Yet 
like areté , the meaning of sophrosyne became increasing enlarged, 
until a word that originally meant "good sense" came to mean something 
like "temperance" (13). This sense of restraint is evident in the famous 
aphorisms that have come to us from the Seven Sages: 'Know thyself, 
'Nothing in excess', and 'measure is best' (13).
What is clear, then, is that there was a shift in the ideological 
notion of human excellence. Heraclitus's inheritance was this widening 
moral sense in human speech and human action, bequeathed him in the 
literature of the old popular tradition.
The other tradition that Heraclitus drew upon was the newly- 
emerging scientific culture. To appreciate this influence, we must look at 
those thinkers of Miletus who preceded Heraclitus and who ushered into 
Greek thought (and therefore Western thought) a method and spirit of 
critical inquiry that in many respects can be called scientific.
The three thinkers who comprise the anachronistically named 
"Milesian school" are Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes. It is with 
these thinkers that investigation into nature moves out of the stage where 
it is still encumbered by mythology into a more objective way of 
questioning based upon principles of reason alone. As Kahn has noted, 
their thinking . .  is not so much a revolution within science as a 
revolution inlfi science..."  (16). It was these early Milesians who, 
through ever-refined geometric models, empirical observations and 
measurements, and the notion of physical change as a conflict of 
opposing powers, conceived of the natural world as a Kosmos : that is, 
an orderly arrangement whose structure can be rationally understood
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(19). These philosophers were concerned with physical investigations, 
investigations into nature, investigations which led them eventually into a 
search tor the origin of things, or what came to be known as the search 
for first principles. But to see them strictly as natural scientists is to 
obscure a very significant aspect of their thinking.
One of the earliest scholars to recover the theological nature in the 
thinking of the early Milesian scientists was the German philologist 
Werner Jaeger. In Theoloav of the Early Greeks , he makes the 
persuasive case that, although in looking at their world the Milesians 
employed a more scientific and empirical method than had the older 
poets and sages, they were essentially motivated in their quest by the 
desire to understand the beginning of things. They were, he claims, 
practising natural theology. "Greek philosophy is genuine natural 
theology," he says, "because it is based on rational insight into the nature 
of reality itself" (3). In turning to the early Milesians, those first scientists 
and, as Jaeger contends, those earliest practitioners of natural theology, 
we will be able to trace those elements of their thought that influence 
Heraclitus.
Although it is with Thales that Milesian rational enquiry begins, it is 
with his successor, Anaximander, that we can most easily see the moral 
nature in the physical conception, and thus the heritage Heraclitus draws 
upon.
Anaximander holds as the first principle something he calls 
apeiron . The logical manner by which he came to conceive apeiron 
becomes evident once we understand that he was reacting to what he 
felt was a limitation in the conception of his predecessor, Thales. Thales 
had held that the origin of everything was water. Yet in looking about him
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at the world, Anaximander could not understand how one substance 
could give rise to all the different substances he perceived. He came to 
the conclusion that the stuff which composes the world must be like none 
of the substances which he could see, but must be something which 
underlies and is common to all the other substances and is found 
everywhere. In other words, it must be common enough to compose all 
substances, but distinct in that it could account for an infinite number of 
substances. What he hit upon was that this stuff, whatever it was, must 
be unbounded. The word for unbounded In Greek is apeiron , and this is 
the name he gives to his first principle fTheologv 24). As Jaeger 
explains, although this word in its ancient context is used in many ways, 
scholarship Is in general agreement that It denotes "the endless, 
inexhaustible reservoir or stock from which all Becoming draws its 
nourishment.. .  "(Theology 24).
There is some question, however, as to how we are to interpret 
this concept. Is Anaximander truly forwarding a first principle? Aristotle, 
writing about two centuries after Anaximander, evidently thought as 
much, for in the third book of his Phvsics. he ascribes to Anaximander 
just such a logical step (Theology 24). Aristotle says: "Everything either 
is itself a beginning or has a beginning. The Boundless, however, has 
no beginning, for otherwise it would have a boundary" (Theoloav 24). 
According to Aristotle, any being without a beginning is a beginning in 
itself. It seems that Anaximander, by making his first principle apeiron or 
the unbounded, is positing a beginning. According to a fragment 
ascribed to Anaximander, his apeiron is "that from which everything 
takes rise and to which everything returns. It is thus the beginning ( ap%T\ 
) and end (xEXemr] ) of everything that exists" (Theoloav 28). It is not
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hard to see how this idea becomes connected with the idea of the Divine, 
or god. A being with neither beginning nor end must be the beginning 
and end of everything (29). Another fragment ascribed to Anaximander, 
and again this comes to us via Aristotle, says of the apeiron that "it 
encompasses all things and governs all things" (Theologv 29). Jaeger 
points out that the two predicates, "governing" and "encompassing," are 
used continually throughout pre-Socratic philosophy to describe the 
activity of the highest principle (Theoloav 30). When Anaximander 
characterizes his unbounded by the two predicates above, Jaeger says 
that "he is satisfying the loftiest demands which religious thought has 
required of divinity from time immemorial; for he makes it the bearer of 
supreme power and dominion" (Theologv 31). Thus, the ontological 
considerations which underlie Anaximander's apeiron possess 
theological significance.
The other idea we must look at in Anaximander is the metaphor he 
conceives to explain the coming-to-be and passing-away, the rise and 
return that characterize the 'unbounded.' In a fragment of Anaximander's 
that comes to us from a later Greek thinker, Simplicius, we read the 
following:
Out of the apeiron. . .  the worlds arise. But from whatever 
things is the genesis of the things that are, into these they 
must pass away according to necessity; for they must pay 
the penalty and make atonement to one another for their 
injustice according to Time's decree. (Theoloav 34)
After the concept of apeiron this idea of "penalty and atonement" is the
most important element in the Anaximandrian philosophy. As Jaeger
explains, it involves the image of a scene from the courtroom. When two
parties are in dispute, "the one who has taken more than his sh are .. .
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must pay damages for his pleonexy to the party he has wronged" 
(Theology 35). The Greek word pleonexy does not translate directly into 
English, but it means something close to "over-reaching greed." For the 
Greeks, the just means the equal, and inequality becomes the very 
essence of injustice. The idea of Time as a judge is to be found in the 
writing of Anaximander's contemporaries, chief among them Solon, "who 
defends himself before the 'bench of Time'" (Theologv 35). Yet it is 
important that we do not interpret this "penalty and atonement" Idea only 
as metaphor, for it is central to an understanding of Anaximander's 
theology that we see that within the metaphor "lies a philosophical 
interpretation of the rationale of the world" (Theologv 34). That Is, the 
universe is truly a kosmos in the Greek sense of the word: it is an 
ordered phenomenon because it is inherently just.
It was at this time that the Greeks were forming city-states and 
developing the ideas of civil law which would govern the community. It is 
from this realm that the idea of justice is derived. But Anaximander's idea 
of justice, or Diké , goes beyond mere human justice. It is a universal 
justice. The power of Diké is derived from the process by which all 
inequalities compensate themselves in time. What Anaximander implies 
is that the idea of justice applies not only in the city-state but in the 
universe as well. We are ready to state finally what it is that Anaximander 
achieves by this principle. According to Jaeger, Anaximander is 
"formulating a moral, not a physical law of nature. There is a deeply 
religious meaning in his conception that natural phenomena are 
governed by a moral standard" (Paideia 160).
Anaximander, then, has not only given us the first principle of the 
universe, but he has conceived of that universe as an inherent morality.
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No longer do we have the mountains and streams of Hellas peopled 
with a number of gods. One force alone guides or steers the cosmos.
We must be careful not to be unhistorical in our interpretation. Just 
because this one force is not in any way a personal god in no way 
diminishes its theological significance or its importance as standing for 
the Divine, for as we said above, Anaximander's conception meets all the 
criteria that the Greeks required in their conception of Divine. No less 
important is the revolutionary idea that, in Anaximander’s conception of 
the cosmos as a process of coming-to-be and passing-away, there is an 
inherently moral dimension. What Anaximander does not do, nor do any 
of the Milesian philosophers for that matter, is relate this Divine cosmos 
in any way to human life. As Jaeger says, "It would not have occurred to 
them to do so, because their investigations were concerned not with 
humanity but with the eternal scheme of things" (Paideia 161 ), It 
remains for succeeding philosophers, foremost among them Heraclitus, 
to relate eternal Being to human life and human values.
II
As was expressed at the very outset of this discussion, by the time 
we reach Heraclitus and his immediate predecessors, Pythagoras, 
Xenophanes and Parmenides, we meet a style of expression very 
different from that of the early Milesian thinkers. The Milesians, led by 
reason and the spirit of discovery, searched earnestly but soberly for the 
meaning behind the things they saw in the world. With Heraclitus and 
the others we have for the first time in history a kind of philosophical
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thinking that bears the stamp of individual personality. Their 
investigations are pursued personally and passionately.
Yet this way of viewing the pre-Socratic philosophers, and 
Heraclitus in particular, is only comparatively recent. Earlier 
interpretations tended to view all of these early thinkers from the 
perspective of the two thinkers from whom much of what we know about 
them comes; Plato and Aristotle. This view focused upon the works of 
the pre-Socratics from that narrow perspective of natural philosophy 
which we discussed earlier. Not only did this diminish the real value of 
their thought but sacrificed as well the implicit theological and moral 
thinking we have spent some time here trying to recover. The new 
picture fortunately allows us not only to understand them better, but also 
to appreciate and understand anew the metaphoric and connotational 
levels their thinking suggests..
Heraclitus especially benefits from this new approach since he is 
by far the most enigmatic, because the most metaphoric, both in his 
thought and in the form of his thought. Again and again throughout the 
sources, Heraclitus is referred to as "the Dark" or "the Obscure." The 
epithets are not inappropriate, for the style of his thought is not only 
metaphorical but highly paradoxical as well. We need only think of 
utterances such as "We step and do not step into the same rivers; we are 
and are not"; and "A road up <and> down <is> one and the same 
<road>" (Fragments 49a, 60 Robinson), to conclude that the author must 
have admired a style of teaching and expression that is anything but 
straightfonward. We should not be surprised then to find that within the 
fragments themselves there are many allusions to mystical teachings. In 
Fragment 92 he refers to the "Sibyl... uttering with raving mouth...," and in
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Fragment 56 he mentions how Homer himself was deceived by the 
riddling boys. But it is in Fragment 93 from which we might infer one 
possible reason for Heraclitus's preference for this style; "The Lord 
whose oracle is in Delphi neither indicates clearly nor conceals but gives 
a sign" (Fragment 93, Robinson). Heraclitus is alluding to the Delphic 
practice of giving advice in indirect form, by riddle or ambiguity. What this 
implies is that all such oracular knowledge requires interpretation. Even 
if the surface meaning appears to be clear, one must be willing to look for 
a second meaning underneath. This is the proper way to understand 
Heraclitus's fragments as well. We will not gain insight Into his teaching 
without careful thought and introspection. The above fragment also 
shows a profound respect in Heraclitus for mystery. There is in oracular 
statements which neither "indicate" nor "conceal" a suggestion that some 
mystery Is good for the seeker. This is an idea that returns in Fowles and 
bears heavily upon his ideas of both the nature of the universe and the 
degree of meaning we can find in it.
What Heraclitus felt most acutely was the void the new Milesian 
conception of the universe created for the individual. Where is there a 
place for the individual in Anaximander's cosmic coming-to-be and 
passing-away? Heraclitus felt that he was connected to the world, that 
things also happened or were caused to happen through and by him.
His thinking begins then partly in a rejection of a cosmic system that does 
not include human beings and partly in the impulse to re-introduce 
human beings back into the scheme of things; to give them a place in the 
cosmic universe. He begins with the individual. This is the spirit of 
adventurous thinking and self-possession behind the fragment, "I made 
enquiry of myself " (Fragment 101, Robinson). Not only does he seek for
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himself, but he begins with himself. He does so not by abandoning 
rational inquiry; he merely begins with himself by refocusing the aim of 
speculative thinking to consider in what way he, and therefore all 
humankind, are a part of things. Though Heraclitus gives it the 
inspiration and direction of his unique thought, this spirit of thinking is not 
his alone. It is the true genius of all Greece, and of the Greek mind.
The unique position of Hellenism in the history of education 
depends on the same peculiar characteristic, the supreme 
instinct to regard everv part as subordinate and relative to 
an ideal whole-for the Greeks carried that point of view into 
life as well as a rt- and.also on their philosophical sense of 
the universal, their perception of the profoundest laws of 
human nature, and of the standards based on them which 
govern the spiritual life of the individual and the structure of 
society. (Jaeger, Paideia I; xxii, the emphasis is mine)
Heraclitus points the way to a whole new world of knowledge via the
human soul contemplating itself.
The continuity from the early Milesians to Heraclitus is preserved 
by the image Anaximander used to help describe his conception of the 
universe; that is, the resolution of pleonexy before the judge of Time. 
Heraclitus too envisions the universe as an infinite process of coming-to- 
be and passing-away, yet in him this process becomes merely a point of 
departure. Heraclitus modifies this idea into what is known as the 
Doctrine of the Unity-of-Opposites. This in turn leads to the original and 
fruitful idea of tension, which we will see is given special emphasis by 
Fowles. We will come to this whole aspect of Heraclitus's thought further 
on. First we must examine the one other central idea that characterizes 
Heraclitus's outlook and that truly marks out his genius.
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It is via the idea of the logos that Heraclitus is able to conceive of a
schema that gives man a place in the cosmic dialectic. Heraclitus begins
his thought with the following fragment.
But of this account [logos], which holds forever, people 
forever prove uncomprehending, both before they have 
heard it and when once they have heard it. For, although 
all things happen in accordance with this account, they are 
like people without experience when they experience 
words and deeds such as I set forth, distinguishing < as I 
do> each thing according to its> real constitution, i.e., 
pointing out how it is . The rest of mankind, however, fail to 
be aware of what they do after they wake up just as they 
forget what they do while asleep. (Fragment 1, Robinson; 
square brackets are my interpolations, and pointed brackets 
contain Robinson's)
It is important to understand the full significance of Heraclitus's logos. As
Jaeger says, "logos for Heraclitus was not the conceptual thinking (voeiv ,
vbripa) of Parmenides, whose pure analytical logic would not admit the
metaphorical idea that the soul is boundless." Rather, "it was a form of
knowledge, the origin of both 'action and speech'" (Paideia 180). From
the very outset, then, logos for Heraclitus has an application to practical
life. It has been pointed out by Jaeger, in both Paideia and Theology ,
that when Heraclitus wants to refer to the way in which knowledge of the
logos affects man, he often uses the word <ppôvnoiç (phronesis). Jaeger
defines phronesis as follows. "It may be interpreted as the creative
apprehension of pure goodness through the inner intuition of the soul
and at the same time as an apprehension of pure being, and also as the
derivation of valuable activity and true knowledge from one and the same
fundamental power of the mind" (Aristotle 81). In phronesis , human
being and human values are conceived together, and knowledge of this
is apprehended "through the inner intuition of the soul." Clearly,
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Heraclitus has in mind a logos that if comprehended leads the individual 
to that most enshrined of all Greek ideals, articulated as early as Homer, 
of 'right thinking and right action’. But Heraclitus goes further. He makes 
this logos the law of the entire cosmos. He does so in Fragment 114, by 
means of the metaphor we first saw in Anaximander.
Those who <would> speak with insight must base 
themselves firmly on that which is common to all, as a city 
does upon <its> law-and much more firmly. For all human 
laws are nourished by one <!aw>; the divine <law>. For it 
holds sway to the extent that it wishes, and suffices for all, 
and is still left over. (Fragment 114, Robinson)
There is a law in the universe, just as there is a law in the city, and this
law-even more important than the law in the city-is universal or common
to all people, and must be followed by all people. We notice that the
metaphor is similar to Anaximander's, only whereas in him it is used
metaphorically to explain the universe, in Heraclitus it is used
metaphorically to explain the individual's place in the universe. The
logos is divine, and an understanding of it will inevitably lead men into
phronesis : right thinking and right action. It affects all people because it
is common.
That is why one must follow that which is <common> [i.e. 
universal. For 'common' means 'universal']. Though the 
account is common, the many live, however, as though they 
had a private understanding (Fragment 2, Robinson)
We must recognize the full significance of what Heraclitus means 
by the word "common". He uses it in the sense of "community." As 
Jaeger tells us elsewhere, community is of tremendous importance to the 
Greeks.
Community is the highest good known to the moral code of 
the city-state: it takes up and transforms the private 
existence of each individual.. .[But].. .[tjhe logos is a still
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higher and more universal 'community' than the law of the 
city: and upon it men can support their lives and their 
thoughts, and 'strengthen' themselves with it, 'as a city 
strengthens itself with law'. (Paideia 181 )
It is via the logos that Heraclitus is able to link the microcosmic world of
human life with the macrocosmic norm of the universe. The metaphor of
the city enables Heraclitus to develop the distinction between the
individual and the community. The community or polis had a
tremendous influence upon the individual because it was a Greek ideal.
"The state was a spiritual entity, which assimilated all the loftiest aspects
of human life and gave them out as its own gifts" (Paideia 108).
Community, then, aside from functioning in the larger metaphor of the city
in communicating the idea that the logos is common, also carries
significance for Heraclitus on its own. It is a Greek ideal, of which whole
the individual is merely a part. By identifying his logos with that which is
common, Heraclitus makes the connection between the individual and
the community.
This obviously has significance in turn for the Greek idea of the 
individual. The individual, and his freedom are defined by and arise from 
a submission to the city-state and its law. The contemporary idea of 
individualistic freedom is very different. In that freedom, the individual 
preserves himself against all those forces that would claim him, 
including, and perhaps especially, those forces of the state. But 
Heraclitus's philosophical liberty never conflicts with the Greek's 
allegiance to his polis . Rather, Heraclitus says that there is a universal 
community and a Divine law to which all are subjected: "that is why one 
must follow that which is <common>" (Fragment 2, Robinson). For 
Heraclitus, then, there is no conflict between the individual and the
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community because the needs of the one are identical with the needs of 
the other.
The discussion between the individual and the community, 
between the Few who heed the logos and the Many who do not, brings 
into focus the distinction between the Few and the Many. This distinction 
is also expressed by another metaphor Heraclitus uses throughout his 
thought-the metaphor of those who are asleep and those who are 
awake. In the use of this metaphor, we can see that Heraclitus is aware 
that not all people will hear the truth of the logos. Let us quote again the 
last part of Fragment 1 :
The rest of mankind, however, fail to be aware of what they 
do after they wake up just as they forget what they do while 
asleep. (Robinson)
It is instructive to read this Fragment in conjunction with another
Fragment.
Uncomprehending, <even> when they have heard cthe 
truth about things?>, they are . . .  absent while present.. .  
.(Fragment 34, Robinson)
Most people, Heraclitus is saying, have little awareness in waking life just
as in their sleep they have dreams and then cannot recollect those
dreams. What the logos does then is clear; it inspires those awake to it
to a new self-consciousness. These, Heraclitus acknowledges, will be
the Few; the Many will not comprehend the logos. They will live lives
without its understanding, and therefore lack true phronesis. They will
be "absent while present." This is part of the meaning of the Few and the
Many that Fowles imports into his thinking as well. But the point must not
be missed: in understanding the logos and living a life in phronesis , we
participate in what is common. What is best for the self is one and the
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same with what will be best for the community. Translated into twentieth- 
century existential language, when we inwardly pursue selfhood (are 
awake to the logos), we realize more profoundly that we must move 
beyond the self (become part of the community). Knowledge of the self 
engenders a knowledge of the self as part of the greater whole.
We have said that Heraclitus inherits the Milesian conception of 
the universe. By tracing the cosmological thinking of the Milesians, 
specifically Anaximander, we have seen that the cosmological model is 
infused by a theological and moral dimension. The idea that the 
universe is inherently just Is behind Heraclitus's thought as well. "Only 
the logos can comprehend the law that Heraclitus calls divine, the law by 
which 'all human laws are nourished" (Paideia 181). Heraclitus claims 
that it is through an understanding of the logos, the divine wisdom, that 
men are taught to follow in 'speech and action' the truth of nature and its 
divine law (Paideia 182). In other words, Heraclitus not only draws upon 
but strengthens the Milesian conception of a universe that is infused with 
a profound morality, but, as well, he strengthens this moral sense of 
wisdom by making his logos Divine.
It is in the Doctrine of the Unlty-of-Opposites that Heraclitus makes 
explicit use of the old Milesian conception of the cosmos, but in a refined 
way. Heraclitus saw in his own life the apparently contradictory nature of 
all things in existence. For Anaximander, the process of coming-to-be 
and passing-away was evidence of an inherently just universe.
Heraclitus saw this universal process in terms of human life: the law in 
the universe is the same as the law in life. Does Heraclitus also see the 
universe as just?
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The answer, as we might expect from a philosopher of paradox, is 
both yes and no. Most people, because they do not know the logos, do 
not understand that the universe is just. What they see is the one term of 
the equation that most thwarts their projects, that most interrupts their 
lives: they see the passing-away or the destroying aspect of life. 
Heraclitus tries to teach them, via the logos (which is at once his 
discourse, the Divine wisdom, and the nature of language) that the 
pattern of human life and the pattern of the cosmic process are one and 
the same (Kahn 22). Therefore, while Chaos is part of the nature of 
reality, it is only one part, and insight into the logos will teach people this 
tnjth.
In his statement that conflict is "the father of all" (Fragment 53, 
Robinson), Heraclitus saw that it was only in conflict that Diké or justice 
could establish herself. This law holds in the entire Cosmos. Abundance 
and lack and all other opposites become merely opposite poles in what 
is really a unified system.
The totality of things, [says Heraclitus] is an exchange for 
fire, and fire an exchange for all things, in the way goods 
<are an exchange> for gold, and gold for goods (Fragment 
90, Robinson).
This system of compensation, this interchange, is merely the flux of an 
underlying unity; "while changing, it rests" (Fragment 84a, Robinson).
Yet this Is a special kind of unity. Heraclitean unity is full of 
tension. To imply this, Heraclitus makes use of the metaphors of the bow 
and the lyre. Just as with the logos, the many will not perceive this.
They do not understand how, while differing from (or: being 
at variance), <it> is in agreement with itself. <There is> a 
back-turning connection, like <that> of a bow or lyre. 
(Fragment 51, Robinson)
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The metaphor of the bow and the lyre is very striking and gets very close 
to what Heraclitus has been at pains to convey. The bow and lyre 
suggest partly the balanced state of things in the tension of the string and 
the wood, but these relationships-even while they change, for instance 
as the string is drawn from the bow-themselves remain changeless. In 
the state of tension between string and bow there is a "back-turning" or 
return to the place at which it began. This further implies the underlying 
unity, the oneness in the apparent clash and contradictoriness of events 
both in human life and the life of the cosmos.
"Not after listening to me, but after listening to the account 
[logos], one does wisely In agreeing that all things are <in 
fact?> one <thing> (Fragment 50, Robinson).
Another metaphor Heraclitus uses to express movement within the 
tensional nature of opposite states is the metaphor of fire.
<The ordered?> world, the same for all, no god or man 
made, but always was, is, and will be, an everliving fire, 
being kindled in measures and being put out in measures. 
(Fragment 30, Robinson)
Here fire is the metaphor for movement or change existing within the
tension of "kindling" and "putting out". Implied once again is the
underlying "oneness" of all things arising from a tensional nature.
We have seen in Heraclitus’s call that people must look within 
themselves for an understanding of the logos, a cardinal point in all 
existential thinking. But Heraclitus makes his logos common-in 
understanding the logos we are led into phronesis (right thinking and 
right acting) and gain possession of the knowledge that the individual is 
part of a higher community. In Heraclitus, then, there is no conflict 
beween the individual and the community, since the self is recognized as 
co-extensive with the universe in general and the political community in
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particular. Finally, then, although there are only a small number of 
people who are awake to the logos (the Few), and although it is 
beginning with themselves that they can become cognizant of the logos, 
when once so awakened, they must follow that which is common 
(universal). In other words, they become members of a higher 
community.
Ill
We are now in position to view some of Fowles's ideas. I will show 
that some of these ideas he borrows directly from Heraclitus, while others 
he transmutes into his ov/n expression. We shall see that by importing in 
many ways Heraclitus’s understanding of the world, Fowles necessarily 
imports both the existential impulse that requires us to look inward, and 
the moral impulse that directs us to look outward into community.
A full reading and complete discussion of The Aristos would be 
necessary to appreciate the full importance that Heraclitus's thinking has 
had upon Fowles. My purpose here requires that we need only direct our 
interest to Fowles's appropriation of two central ideas from Heraclitus; 
Heraclitus's conception of the universe, and the moral character of that 
conception. My examination will show that the moral conception of the 
universe that runs from Anaximander through to Heraclitus is preserved 
and transmuted by Fowles into what we have termed his moral impulse. 
The moral impulse is manifested in Fowles's fiction in the journey the 
characters undergo. If they initiate the inward journey (Heraclitus's 
understanding of the logos), they then recognize.the need to transcend 
themselves and merge into community via a commitment to others.
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What we said of Heraclitus so too must hold for Fowles: we cannot 
easily separate his cosmology from his theology and his morality. 
Although Fowles does not use these terms, we can see cosmological, 
theological, and moral aspects in his conception of the universe.
Fowles conceives the universe in essentially the same way as 
Heraclitus.
Matter in time appears to us, with our vested interest in 
survival, to be governed by two opposing principles: Law, 
or the organizing principle, and Chaos, or the disintegrating 
one. These two, the one to us sorting and erecting, the 
other to us demolishing and causing havoc, are in eternal 
conflict. This conflict is existence.(The Aristos 14)
There are two ideas introduced here: there are two opposing forces, and
there is the conflict between them. Let us begin by looking at the first.
Where Heraclitus conceived coming-to-be and passing-away In 
the Anaximandrian conception of pleonexy before the judge of Time, in 
like manner, Fowles sees Law and Chaos as the two forces that 
comprise the reality of the universe. "The known universe," he says, "is 
uniform in its constituents and its laws" (14); and further on: "In the 
whole, nothing is uniust” (The Aristos 14). Once again we encounter the 
conception of a universe as two opposing forces, and once again, the 
emphasis that this universe is just.
But what is only implicit in Heraclitus becomes explicit and, we will 
see, of central importance in Fowles. We remember that behind the idea 
of justice lies the concept of equality. Heraclitus never says much about 
this, probably because it was an obvious aspect of the Greek ideal of 
justice, which, as the foundation of their law, was taken for granted. *
* I am not unaware of the fact that slavery in Greek society makes this 
statement seem nonsensical. This anomaly, to my knowledge, is not 
recognized by Heraclitus in his utterances, nor is it addressed by any of
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Thus, the notion of equality was inherent in Heraclitus's notion of a 
cosmic norm. We might also see in Heraclitus's silence on equality 
another reason. In Heraclitus's society, there was, at least in theory, little 
conflict between the individual and the community. What was good for 
the one was good for the other, and vice versa .We have elsewhere 
talked about this aspect of life in the Greek city-state. For Fowles, 
however, and therefore our own age, the conflict between individual 
freedom and social responsibility has reached a critical point. In Fowles, 
the concept of equality becomes very explicit in all his thinking. It most 
often appears under the guise of social equality, and becomes the 
modus operand! for much of his moral thinking. It is also the necessary 
condition or state of mind needed before one can move beyond the 
egocentrism of the individual to amelioration in community.
If one word could sum up all that is wrong with our world, it
is surely inequalitv Hazard, the great factor we shall
never be able to control, will always infest life with 
inequality. And it seems madness that man himself should 
continue blindly to propagate this vicious virus in our world 
instead of trying to limit it. (The Aristos 11 )
This is one of Fowles’s larger purposes. A universe that is inherently just
is a universe that balances, based upon the concept of equality. People
must learn to balance their selfish and individual caprice against social
responsibility. What is equality if not a balancing in all areas of life? But
how are we to divine this purpose? We do so the way Heraclitus showed
us: we participate in a higher wisdom when we initiate the inward
journey into authentic selfhood.
the interpreters on him that I have read. In my opinion, it seems quite 
clear that in the fragments that have come down to us, Heraclitus means 
his words to be taken for universal norms and values that hold for all 
h u m an k in d .
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It Is to the eradication of inequality that The Aristos is in part 
addressed. People must be led into an awareness of the inequality in 
the social realm. Fowles's characters, when sufficiently educated to go 
beyond the self, ultimately perceive the need to respect and promote 
equality and freedom in the outer world. Fowles emphasizes this when 
he sums up our purpose, our reason for living.
Each form of animate matter is given a reason for living; and 
our human reason is the establishment of equality of 
recompense of living. Since in our present world 
unnecessary inequalities are ubiquitous, a proper synoptic 
education must lead to a sense of discontentment that is 
also a sense of moral purpose. (The Aristos 182-3)
It should not be difficult to see how the concept of equality leads 
easily to other Fowlesian ideas as well, among them freedom. Fowles 
has repeatedly said that it is freedom that all his novels attempt to 
explore. But freedom is one of those very large words that, unless 
limited, tends to be meaningless. Fowles, it would seem, is talking about 
several different ideas of freedom.
First, because he is an existentialist, freedom in this context takes 
on special meaning. Because Fowles holds with Sartre that the great 
spectre to being is non-being, this places upon man the burden of 
freedom; the responsibility for freely making himself. But whereas for 
Sartre this freedom is in toto , and therefore a terrible freedom, in Fowles 
it is a relative freedom. "All our 'free' choices may be finally attributable 
to some conditioning over which we have no control. Even if we could 
establish the contrary-total free will-we are still limited," he says, "since 
to be completely free we should need an absolutely free field of choice 
as well as the freedom to choose in it" (The Aristos 68). Nevertheless,
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freedom-relative or not-is a condition that must be protected and 
promoted if our existence is to be meaningful.
Yet another meaning of freedom we find used in Fowles is 
freedom in the philosophically negative sense, or freedom from . This 
kind of freedom necessitates the elimination of factors that prevent 
someone from exercising free choice. This is the sense of freedom 
Fowles has in mind when he says in The Aristos. "Freedom of will is 
strictly related to freedom of living condition" (70). To increase freedom 
in this realm, the social realm, requires the promotion of greater social 
equality.
We said that there were two aspects in Fowles's cosmological 
statement. The first aspect is the opposing of forces. The second aspect 
Is the conflict between them. Let us remind ourselves of the quotation.
These two [forces], the one to us sorting and erecting, the 
other to us demolishing and causing havoc, are in eternal 
conflict. This conflict is existence. (The Aristos 14)
We will immediately notice, remembering our discussion of Heraclitus,
that the ideas contained in this statement parallel Heraclitus’s almost
exactly. Heraclitus used the metaphor of the scene from a courtroom to
realize his conception of a universe that is balanced in the process of
coming-to-be and passing-away. He used the metaphor of war to help
articulate his idea of the unity in the clash of opposing forces. Fowles
sees the universe in terms of Law and Chaos, and for him it is the conflict
between these two that characterizes their unity. Heraclitus says "war"
and Fowles says "conflict." They are talking about the same thing. Yet
just as there is a subtle difference in Fowles’s conception of the opposing
forces, so too does he conceive differently the unity-of-opposites
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doctrine, and in the process achieves what we may consider to be a 
subtle but compelling refinement. Heraclitus claimed that in the clash of 
opposites, which he saw all around him, was to be found the one major 
principle underlying all reality. "War is father of all and king of all" 
{Fragment 53, Robinson). In another fragment Heraclitus identifies this 
underlying principle, war or strife, with God.
God<is> day <and> night, winter <and> summer, war 
<and> peace, satiety <and> famine, and undergoes change 
in the way that <fire?>, whenever It is mixed with spices, 
gets called by the name that accords with <the> bouquet of 
each <spice>. (Fragment 67, Robinson)
What is important is that behind all these opposites is a single something
which men give different names to but which is always the same thing.
This one thing that underlies all pairs of opposites, and that therefore
really unites them, Heraclitus calls divine, and in another fragment this
divine force becomes Zeus.
One thing, the only wise thing, is willing and unwilling to be 
called by the name Zeus. (Fragment 32, Robinson)
Heraclitus says "unwilling" because he is sensitive to the
anthropomorphic tradition, and does not want his meaning of Zeus to be
confused with the old Zeus; "willing", because his Zeus is identical with
the religious impulse that spawned the old Zeus (Robinson, 102). As
Robinson remarks, Heraclitus quite clearly means to imply by the use of
the word Zeus "supreme divinity" (102). What Heraclitus does then is
identify 'strife' or 'change' with God, the "one" behind all reality.
Things grasped together; things whole, things not whole; 
<something> being brought together, <something> being 
separated; <something> consonant, <something> 
dissonant. Out of all things <comes?> one thing, and out of 
one thing all things. (Fragment 10, Robinson)
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Here we see once again that what is essentially a cosmological idea 
transforms and renews the basis for a theological conclusion. The idea 
that all the opposites in life are explained by the one concept of strife, 
and that in strife there is a unity, one single thing, has obvious theological 
overtones in Heraclitus's philosophy.
Fowles's parallel idea, that of the tensional nature of the universe 
(which as in Heraclitus derives from his previously held model of cosmic 
justice), at first glance does not achieve quite the same theological 
overtones. Whereas in Heraclitus the relationship between pairs of 
opposites is essentially one of unity, in Fowles the opposites stand 
forever apart, but the relationship between them takes on the dynamic of 
mutual support. Each idea, or in Fowlesian terminology, counterpole, 
exists in its opposition to other counterpoles. The noun is plural here, as 
Fowles says that each idea has more than one counterpole.
The obvious counterpole of an idea is the contrary idea.
The world is round ; the world is not round . But whatever 
else stands between my mind and its continuous 
concentration on the idea (The world is round) is also a 
counterpole. (The Aristos 83)
Besides the basic antinomy between two poles, there exists a similar
antinomy among many other poles. This is Fowles's own refinement. He
multiplies infinitely the original two forces. He uses a metaphor to
explain this tensional state.
Between all these counterpoles, both choosable and 
inevitable, and the '!' pole there exists a relationship; but 
since the counterpoles are in themselves poles and have 
their own counterpoles (one of which is constituted by T) 
the situation of the T pole is analogous to a kind of complex 
tug-of-war. We must imagine countless teams all of whose 
ropes are knotted at a centre; of differing strength, some 
directly combining, others obliquely affecting, many 
diametrically opposed. This central knot is the T; and the
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diverse forces pulling at it make the state of tension. (The 
Aristos 87)
At first glance, the Heraclitean unity-of-opposltes doctrine and the 
Fowlesian tensional nature appear very different. However, this may 
owe more to a rigidly held conception of the unity-of-opposites doctrine 
than is warranted. If we look more closely at Heraclitus’s doctrine we 
may find a more flexible interpretation. Jaeger says at one point in his 
discussion, "At bottom Heraclitus’s unity cannot strictly be perceived in 
any of the visual forms he uses for illustration" (Theoloov 120). Indeed, 
many of the fragments, although translated essentially the same, can and 
do yield subtle and different interpretations. For instance Fragment 50, 
the fragment that makes use of the metaphor of the bow and the lyre, has 
often been used to introduce the idea of harmony, which becomes a 
created third force arising from the unity of things diverse. Let us look at it 
more closely. It appears like this in Jaeger:
They [the Many] do not understand how that which draws 
apart agrees with itself: a fitting together with counter- 
tension, as of the bow and the lyre. (Fragment 50, in 
Iheoloflv 120)
How shall we interpret the word "agrees"? It seems that most 
commentators interpret this to mean unity. That is, something that 
appears to be disunited, "that which draws apart", is really the same, 
"agrees with itself", or is a unity. But can we not see in "agree” an 
interpretation something like Fowles's? That is, is there not a sense of 
agreement between two ideas, or rather an Idea and its counterpole, 
each one deriving definition and support from the other? This situation 
would be a "fitting together" of sorts, with "counter-tension" between the 
poles, which can be seen as a kind of harmony in their relationship to
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each other. Thus there is a unity in the relationship between the idea 
and its poles.
Although in these two ideas of unity there are slight differences, 
their significance is the same, in the relationship between things diverse 
there is an explanation of the reality of the universe. This is the meaning 
and significance that Fowles derives from the Heraclitean doctrine, and it 
just so happens that it is similar to what Heraclitus, in the vast richness of 
his allusive language, was pointing toward all along.
By way of conclusion, it is important to reiterate the process by 
which ideas (profoundly theological in nature) are transformed from early 
Greek philosophy through Heraclitus until we see them again, in their 
own character but stamped inevitably by their intellectual and 
philosophical heritage, informing the fiction of John Fowles.
With the aid of modern scholarship and fresh perspective, Werner 
Jaeger advances a thesis-one that interprets ancient pre-Socratic 
thinking and restores to it a profound theological nature-that challenges 
the ideological hegemony surrounding pre-Socratic thought. By means 
of Jaeger's argument, we have traced the thinking of the early Milesians 
through Heraclitus to Fowles, and have said that, with a new 
understanding of the theological nature of early Greek philosophy, and 
particularly Heraclitus, we can see when we come to Fowles the origin of 
his moral impulse. We have done this primarily by taking our instruction, 
as so many commentators have done, from Fowles himself. We have 
seen how the theological thinking of the early Greeks is not pure abstract 
reasoning, but, as we should expect from the Greek mind, an organic 
outgrowth from the very way they see all things: as one part of a greater 
whole. Thus, we see how their idea of the divine is related to all men.
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because it is common, and how following the common, that which is 
communal, we are led into 'right thinking and right action'. The 
community then is both the alpha and omega of our moral impulse.
Finally, we see how Fowles draws upon these ideas, and thus 
understand in a more complete way the origin of his moral impulse. This 
understanding gives us a new perspective upon his fiction, and we can 
better account for the important idea of community that all his fictions 
seem inevitably to build. At the same time, we see resolved the apparent 
contradictoriness of his existential position with his moral impulse. We 
see how he can be at the same time an existential relativist and a 
profound ethicist. We see, finally, a way to balance the lonely call of the 
individual with the absolutely necessary answer of social responsibility.
It remains only to say something about Fowles's concept of "God."
It is worth quoting again what he had to say about this issue. In The 
Aristos , he says: "1 do not consider myself an atheist, yet this concept of 
'God' and our necessary masterlessness obliges me to behave in all 
public matters as if I were" (28). When Fowles says "this concept of 
'God'" he is referring to the Christian concept of a personal God. In other 
words, although he is definitely not thinking of a Christian 'God,' might he 
be thinking of a God more like Heraclitus's? As well as describing war as 
the oppositional clash, Heraclitus also described it as the "thunderbolt." 
As Robinson points out, the allusions to Zeus would have been in his 
mind. Zeus was often portrayed with a thunderbolt in his hand (Robinson 
126). Heraclitus further endows the "thunderbolt" with divinity when he 
says, "And the thunderbolt steers the totality of things" (Fragment 64, 
Robinson). We explained earlier how important the "steering" metaphor 
is for divinity. Now, Fowles chooses a different word to describe what the
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conflict is for him: he calls it "hazard." In The Aristos. he translates the 
same fragment above in this way: "The keraunos [the thunderbolt, chaos, 
hazard] steers all things" (215). Are we to see then in Fowles’s hazard 
something divine? The answer must be yes. To say "hazard" steers all. 
as Fowles interprets Heraclitus's fragment 64, carries the same ideas of 
divinity as saying, "God" steers all. Just as Heraclitus's conception of the 
"divine" or "God" is free from any personal attributes, so is Fowles's. But 
this does not prevent it from being divine. Just as Heraclitus's divine is 
full of mystery for man, so too is Fowles's. And for Fowles, we will never 
know the mystery from which hazard (God) derives. W e will never know 
the ultimate meaning of why we are here. It is enough to know that we 
are.
Before we leave his cosmology, we should say something more 
about his "God". We must understand the great gulf that exists between 
the Greek mind and the modern mind upon the idea of God. What we are 
talking about really is the gulf between the pre- and post-Christian world. 
For the Greeks, and thus for Heraclitus, the idea of one god was the idea 
of the Divine, and it was conceived of not so much as form as it was force 
(Theologv 169). It is from the early Christian era that the idea of a 
personal God catches on and with a good deal of help from the Christian 
theologians of the day holds the imagination of people. Fowles's 
conception of "God" is essentially Greek, and it is very possible that it 
derives, as I have shown above, from his pre-Socratic source. He makes 
in The Aristos a cosmological statement that we can take to be a clear 
statement of his idea of God: "There can be no power or god in the 
whole that is concerned for any one thing, though there may be a power 
concerned for the whole" (15). The "God" we find in the above statement
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is one that rules out any active interest in human beings as individuals or 
in human affairs. Rather, for Fowles, "God", if it must be conceived of as 
anything, is conceived of as merely an impersonal force in the universe, 
very often as mystery. As such, this is not so different from Heraclitus’s 
divinenomos, or mind.
Conflict, or the tensional nature of the universe, was for Heraclitus 
the one truth behind human existence. Heraclitus saw in this tensional 
conflict a unity like the tensional unity achieved in the bow and the lyre. 
Such was the nature of the human condition. Fowles too sees conflict as 
the one true reality in life. He employs, much as Heraclitus did, various 
metaphors to explain this. We are like a man on a tightrope that must 
balance. But he tells us, there is no such thing as a state of perfect 
balance. "For us, the only perfect balance can be the living balance" 
(88). In other words, life is a constant struggle for balance. But this 
condition is the best of all possible worlds for mankind. Fowles's unity in 
the tensional nature of reality is our continuing necessity to balance and 
thereby harmonize the tensions. Both Heraclitus and Fowles see this 
tensional state as man's ultimate existential condition. As Fowles says, 
the ultimate tension-between what we know and what we will never 
know-cannot be transposed; it is the source of human being (100-1).
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Chapter Two: The Collector
Eyes and ears are poor witnesses for men if 
their souls do not understand the language.
Heraclitus, XVI
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Of the many studies that are now in existence on John Fowles, 
there seems to be a discernible trend as to the ordering of the works. 
Many of the earliest studies began by examining the fictions in the order 
that they were published. This meant that The Collector was dealt with 
first, followed by the The Magus. Fowles then let it be known that, 
although The Collector was first published, The Maous was in fact first 
written. As a consequence, most studies that were issued after this 
revelation reversed the original trend, and dealt first with The Maous. 
then with The Collector. The motive that they were following, 
presumably, is that there is an aesthetic development in an author’s 
career, and therefore order of publication becomes less critical than the 
order of composition. I have chosen to run counter to the prevailing 
trend, and therefore begin my study with The Collector. My reason for 
doing so is that, unlike the other fictions I will examine. The Collector 
manifests the thesis of the present study in a unique way.
I have argued in the first chapter that Fowles’s fiction shows the 
development of a moral impulse that he derived from the pre-Socratic 
philosopher Heraclitus. Heraclitus believed that through introspection 
people would become aware of a wisdom, the logos , the knowledge of 
which would lead them to a deeper understanding of the world and their 
place in it. Engendered in this deeper awareness is the insight that 
caring for the self means caring for the other, since the individual and the 
community become one and the same.
In the character of Frederick Clegg we see a person who fails to 
initiate the first stage of the journey. Clegg is existentially inauthentic, 
and being so, will never gain the insight of the need to move beyond the 
self. By contrast. In the character of Miranda Richardson we see a person
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who embarks upon the journey of self-discovery and, in doing so, is able 
to attain the knowledge that she must act beyond the self. She achieves 
some measure of both existential authenticity and moral awareness.
My examination, then, sees The Collector as a story with two 
protagonists, or we might say, a story in which each character becomes 
the other's antagonist. Either way, this view is different from most critical 
interpretations. The most conventional of these see Miranda as the 
protagonist who, in her confinement and ultimate death, fails to achieve 
any kind of meaningful liberation. A different interpretation, offered by 
Carol Barnum, essentially sees Clegg as the protagonist. Argued in a 
Jungian context, Barnum’s claim is that The Collector must be 
considered an anti-myth, since Frederick Clegg fails utterly in his journey 
toward individuation.
My view, then, sees The Collector as neither anti-myth nor 
journey-myth alone: rather, it is both.
A profoundly repressed and lonely young man becomes obsessed 
with a young, beautiful, and popular girl. Conveyed by a tone that we 
cannot fail to miss, he feels her to be, in all likelihood, unattainable. This 
situation is suddenly altered when the young man wins a considerable 
sum of money in a lottery. He then begins a daydream in which the 
young girl might one day love him. The reality, he knows, is that she will 
probably never do so. They are from different social classes, which, at 
least in his mind, is tantamount to being from different worlds. In order to 
bridge this seemingly impossible gulf, he kidnaps and imprisons her, 
hoping that she will learn to love him.
Such, in its barest essence, is the plot of The Collector. Although 
the story does move to a resolution, and with a minor twist (when Clegg
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5 1
decides not to commit suicide), from this point on there is very little 
physical action. One suspects that this fact alone would have seriously 
taxed the patience of the average reader of thrillers. In actuality, the 
majority of the novel is concerned with the psychological confrontation 
between Clegg and Miranda. The plot proper, then, in a novel with more 
than three-hundred pages, happens in the first twenty-seven pages. This 
fact makes it all the more surprising that John Fowles’s first published 
novel should have been reviewed as a thriller, at least initially.
But of course the novel was more than just a simple thriller.
Fowles, in the preface to the second edition of The Aristos . found it
necessary to explain his deeper intentions.
History.. .  shows that society has persistently seen life in 
terms of a struggle between the Few and the Many, 
between ’Them’ and ’Us’. My purpose in The Collector was 
to attempt to analyse, through a parable, some of the results 
of this confrontation. (10)
The antiphonal structure of the novel, where first Frederick Clegg and
then Miranda Grey give-in a retrospective account and a diary
respectively-their thoughts during Miranda’s confinement, should have
been an obvious clue that something further was Intended. From this
seemingly simple stmcture Fowles derives no small number of
achievements.
Firstly, the situation of imprisoner and imprisoned is dramatically 
heightened. If we had been given only Clegg’s version of events, we 
would be in the comfortable world of the conventional thriller. We would 
need only to sit back safely and view the machinations of a sinister mind. 
We would be concerned simply with what he might do to the girl and how 
he would do it. This is the kind of writing that, Fowles claims, makes for a
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reading experience that is entirely too passive. Instead, by placing us 
inside the mind of the victim as well as the victimizes Fowles has 
dramatically doubled the reading experience.
More significantly, the structure works to draw us into the story 
futher, because by being presented with two different psychological 
interpretations of the same event, it is impossible for us to remain 
passive. Rather, we are compelled to a more active role as judge of the 
characters' thoughts and actions. But judgement is difficult because, as 
Kerry McSweeney points out, the characterization is subtly drawn (131). 
Although Clegg must surely be seen as monstrous, the facts of his mean 
upbringing elicit some measure of sympathy. Likewise Miranda, 
although assuredly an innocent victim, is presented in such a way that 
we do not fail to see that she is, at least initially, snobbish and shallow. 
That neither Clegg nor Miranda is drawn so as to weaken the story into a 
simple allegory is a delicate and tine achievement.
Finally, the structure achieves the creation of what I call an 
existential window. At the heart of modern existentialism is the primacy 
of choice. We are and will become the people we choose to be. The 
Collector, by presenting, as it were, a retrospective interior monologue of 
each character's thinking in and around significant events throughout the 
imprisonment, allows us to witness the thinking behind the choices each 
makes. We are allowed to see where they go and why they go there.
This crystallizes the fact that their end, whatever it may be, is the result of 
a series of personal choices. At the end of the novel, both Clegg and 
Miranda are responsible for the state of their existential and moral souls.
Let us turn to the novel to assess the success or failure of their 
existential and moral journeys.
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Fowles first gives us Clegg's perspective. From the outset, Fowles 
takes care to show us Clegg’s background. Clegg is the product of the 
lower middle class, who, orphaned as a young child, is raised by a 
suffocatingly dull and narrow aunt. As a clerk in a menial job, Clegg has 
few friends. Those people who might be called friends are held by Clegg 
to be beneath him. The window of the Town Hall Annex, then, from 
which Clegg first views Miranda, is a potent symbol: Clegg is an outsider 
not only to Miranda’s world, but in many ways, to the world in general.
Yet, even though Fowles has given us the details of Clegg's social 
status, we must not overly emphasize the significance of this fact. 
Fowles's parable is primarily about a confrontation between people from 
different intellectual and moral classes. While Clegg’s social status may 
have unjustly shaped him, ultimately, we must not lose sight of his 
intellectual and moral failure.
It is not very far into the novel, only one page, before we get our 
first insight into Clegg's existential condition. He says of Miranda: "The 
only time I didn't have nice dreams about her being when I saw her with 
a certain young man, a loud noisy public-school type who had a sports 
car" (4). Clegg's resentful tone betrays his feelings of inferiority as an 
outsider to Miranda and her class. She is his dream, and as he will tell 
us repeatedly, "I can't ever get to know her in the ordinary way"(14).
Yet Clegg’s inferiority, eventually pathological, is only a symptom 
of his deeper problem. Clegg's real problem is that he is unable to see 
himself as the principal actor in his own life. From the earliest moment 
we meet him it is evident to the reader that Clegg does not believe he is 
able to will and enact choices. He says about his dreams of Miranda: 
"Those were the days I let myself have the bad dreams" (5). Clegg never
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says, "I dreamed," or "my dream," which is the usual way a person talks 
about his or her dreams. The way that Clegg speaks suggests that the 
dreams are outside of him, that they are at a remove from him.
The fact that Clegg never seems to make choices is embedded 
everywhere In his language and thinking. When he alludes to the fact of 
Miranda’s capture, he characteristically says, "What I’m trying to say is 
that having her as my guest happened suddenly, it wasn’t something I 
planned the moment the money came" (11 ). Here he ascribes his 
kidnapping of Miranda to the inscrutable agency of chance. In Fowlesian 
terminology, Clegg is nemo-tyrannized. As Fowles says, "the nemo 
gains power over our behavior to the extent that we believe that were it 
not for the faults of the human condition, or of society, or of our education, 
or of our economic position, then we might be what we can imagine" (48). 
It must be evident from the above that nemo-tyrannized persons feel 
that all the reasons they are what they are lie beyond themselves. They 
feel that they do not have choice in their lives. In the case of Clegg, this 
is carefully reinforced by having his fortunes changed not by an act of his 
own will, but by the potent symbol of chance: he wins the lottery.
That Clegg does not see that he has the ability to make choices is 
further shown in his response to the statement Miranda makes to him 
concerning his fortune. "You can change, you're young, you've got
money.. You can learn Only you've got to shake off the past. You’ve
got to kill your aunt and the house you lived in and the people you lived 
with. You’ve got to be a new human being" (79). Clegg responds,
"Some hope" (79). It is one more irony in a book of ironies that, although 
it is Clegg who is the collector of butterflies, it is Miranda who has the 
insight that in order for one to metamorphose something of the old self
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must die in order that some aspect of a new self may be born. In these 
words, as we will see later, Miranda utters the prescription that will 
enable her to be reborn.
Chance or hazard plays a very large role in Fowles’s thinking. As 
we saw in the last chapter, it is one of the basic constituents of his 
universe. As such, we must learn to accept it and incorporate it into our 
conception of reality. But this is not the way that Clegg conceives 
chance. For him, rather, chance becomes a power upon which he can 
project his failures and to which he can yield his responsibilities.
The last episode I will discuss in which we see Clegg ascribe his 
actions to the inscrutable and arbitrary element of chance is the part in 
his account in which he relates the events leading up to the moment of 
Miranda's capture.
I took a risk, perhaps I wanted to give fate a chance to stop 
me. I went into the cafe and had my supper. Then I went to 
my van and parked where I could see the cinema. I didn’t 
know what to expect, perhaps she was meeting a friend. I 
mean I felt I was swept on, like down rapids, I might hit 
something, I might get through.(23)
Clegg’s real problem is that he lets life happen to him and that he never
consciously acts in his own life. Further, Clegg’s refusal to see himself as
an agent making choices contributes to his overwhelming feelings of
inferiority. In relinquishing to the agent of chance his own power for
choosing, Clegg unwittingly undermines his own identity. I said earlier
that Clegg reveals himself as having feelings of inferiority. The more
Clegg attributes his choices to chance, the less he sees himself as
making choices and the more inferior he feels. In his circular pattern of
neuroses, Clegg is the victim of a tragedy of his own making.
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We might locate in Clegg's refusal to see that he has choices, 
another theme prominent in existential thought often closely related to 
the theme of choice : the theme of responsibility.
Of course, the fact that Clegg sees the power of choice as lying 
beyond him enables him to commit actions without having to face 
responsibility for those actions. There is an amusing scene, if in such a 
dark work we can call it such, where Miranda and Clegg meet for the first 
time. She is much sharper than Clegg expects, and with pointed 
questions, gets Clegg stumbling after her. What is interesting is that 
when confronted with Miranda's questions, Clegg, clearly not prepared 
for her frontal attack, claims he is not responsible. "Suddenly I saw a way 
out. I said. I'm only obeying orders"{29). As Miranda questions Clegg 
further, her initial skepticism-at Clegg’s suggestion that he is under the 
orders of the bank manager from Barclays-turns to sarcasm, and she 
verbally corners Clegg a second time. This time Clegg feebly counters 
with, "There’s other things I can't tell you. I’m in his power’’(31 ). At this 
point, the reader is aware that Clegg is lying, Miranda suspects that he is 
lying, and obviously Clegg himself knows that he’s lying. Clegg's 
tragicomic disavowal of responsibility in this scene serves only to 
heighten those places in the remainder of his account where he either 
absolves himself from or fails even to recognize his responsibility. To 
echo a term suggested by Dwight Eddins, Clegg falls to claim any 
"authorship" in the events that constitute his life (38-54).
Another belief espoused by the existentialist credo is dedication to 
reality. Thus far in our discussion, we can see that Clegg is quite far from 
reality. Of his earliest fantasies about Miranda, the fantasies where he 
and Miranda live in a big modern house in wtiich she draws pictures and
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he looks after his collection, Clegg comments, "Of course I am not mad, 1
knew it was just a dream and always would have been if it hadn't been
for the money" (4). But Clegg is mad, and his capture of Miranda, more
than mere dream. Very early we are aware that Clegg has problems
distinguishing reality from fantasy, or what he refers to as "dreams."
Fowles develops the motif of dream/lllusion versus reality throughout the
novel, and we shall see that he makes use of it again, though in a
different way, in The Maous . The confusion in Clegg between the two is
made evident In the following passage:
That was the day I first gave myself the dream that came 
true. It began where she [Miranda] was being attacked by a 
man and I ran up and rescued her, only I didn't hurt; 1 
captured her and drove her off in the van to a remote house 
and there I kept her captive in a nice w ay. . . .  It kept me 
awake at nights, it made me forget what 1 was doing during
the day It stopped being a dream, it began to be what
I pretended was really going to happen (of course, I thought 
it was only pretending).. .  .(14)
Clegg's reality-bitter, cramped, and solitary-gives way to dream fantasy,
where he can have all he lacks: self-worth, companionship, and of
course Miranda.
That Clegg refuses to see himself as making choices, and further, 
that he refuses to accept responsibility for the choices he nevertheless 
makes underscores the fact that Frederick Clegg, as the novel opens. Is 
essentially an inauthentic individual. In the paradigm that I have been 
suggesting, Clegg must be seen as failing completely. There is in Clegg 
no Heraclitean journey into selfhood, and therefore there can be no 
understanding that he has a responsibility to Miranda. Clegg’s inability 
to turn outward morally to the community, because of his failure to make 
the Inward journey, is shown in his wholly isolated existence. In fact, this
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is what he uses his wealth to do: to retreat to a fortress where he can live 
without social obligations. What is absolutely clear is that Miranda's fate, 
dependent upon Clegg’s existential insight, is tenuous from the 
beginning. Although she does try to reach Clegg, Clegg is far too 
inauthentic to be reached.
We first meet Miranda in Clegg's account, through his eyes, and it 
is only later we meet her through her own diary. Since all Clegg's 
thoughts about Miranda are colored by the fact that he is infatuated with 
her, it behooves us to look only to the factual details he gives us, and not 
his rapturous, subjective observations, as revealing as those may be. 
Fowles has Clegg relate that Miranda is more than beautiful; she is also 
clever and talented, and has won a scholarship to a prestigious London 
art school. With nothing more to go on than this, we have already 
contrasted before us two very different people. Clegg is a young man 
who is an undistinguished, inauthentic, and lonely outsider. Miranda is 
plainly everything Clegg is not. From Clegg's account of his early spying 
upon her, we know that she has many friends. Miranda has obviously 
made choices, and no doubt sacrifices, that have led her to distinguish 
herself; she has even been awarded a scholarship. Where Clegg has 
led a dull and suffocating life, both publicly and privately, Miranda has 
made choices and taken actions that have broadened her world. She 
has had some hand in shaping her destiny. Yet it is not until we reach 
the point in the novel where we are presented with her diary that we can 
truly "wonder at" Miranda.
As soon as we begin part two, which is the record of Miranda's 
diary, we are immediately overwhelmed by the change in atmosphere. In 
what is surely the greatest irony in the novel (and just as certainly
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Fowles’s larger purpose), we see that Clegg's account-in its narrow 
focus, stilted language, and confused and halting syntax-is reflective of 
his narrow, unimaginative and mean life. Miranda’s world, by contrast, 
veritably explodes. We read her diary and feel at once that we, as 
readers, have been liberated from a small, suffocating, confinement into 
a place of fresh air, open spaces, and sunshine. We could find many 
examples in Miranda's diary of movement that Dwight Eddins, in his 
article "Existence as Authorship," has called "liberator" behaviour (38- 
43). Let us tune our ears to the opening words of her diary, where we 
hear the power, the purpose, and the authorship of her mind and life.
It’s the seventh night.
I keep on thinking the same things. If only they knew. If 
only thev knew.
Share the outrage.
So now I'm trying to tell it to this pad he bought me this 
morning. His kindness.
Calmly.
Deep down I get more and more frightened. It's only 
surface calm.
No nastiness, no sex thing. But his eyes are mad. Grey 
with a grey lost light in them. To begin with I watched him 
all the time. I thought it must be sex, if 1 turned my back I did 
it where he couldn’t spring at me, and I listened. I had to 
know exactly where he was in the room.
Power, it’s become so real. (123)
We could say much about these few words, so revealing are they of 
Miranda. She begins immediately with time and place. She orients 
herself, naturally, and so too the reader feels oriented. We leave behind 
the grey, static, past tense of Clegg's narrative and world for Miranda's 
dynamic now. The sentences rush, at first short, chopped, quick, but 
soon lengthen and, as they do, draw us along. She writes-has waited 
for pen and paper to do so-and as we read her thoughts, we become 
aware of how at home she is in the realm of speech, thought, and idea.
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The portrait she draws in words is vivid and articulate, and her mind is 
always going, framing hypotheses, strategies, and evaluations.
The fact that the characters shape their lives, or fail to do so, is one 
way we can assess their growth. Dwight Eddins argues that the 
characters' ability to fashion their lives through a creative balancing 
between the eidetic and contingent categories of reality is one of 
Fowles's central concerns (38-53). In light of this, we can see that 
Miranda is learning what it means to be the author of her own life. 
Miranda, primarily through her intellectual capacity, has the ability and 
the power to transcend herself. Whereas Clegg-intellectually and 
imaginatively handicapped-is a "Collector," able only to reify life into a 
series of collectibles, Miranda achieves the status of "Liberator" in her 
creative juxtaposition of the eidetic and contingent.
Yet another test of each character is how much each learns or tries 
to learn and understand the other.
Clegg makes no real effort to learn from or understand Miranda. 
Clegg is most content when she is silent, merely around to be looked at, 
admired, but not heard. From his first face to face meeting with Miranda 
("It's funny, she didn't look quite like I'd always remembered her"[28j), 
Clegg must continually look away from Miranda because she looks at 
him. Clegg does not want real communication with anyone, because he 
feels small and insignificant. As he himself has said earlier, when he 
speaks he gives himself away, or he doesn't act right (4). Clegg is not 
interested in Miranda as a human being. He wants, rather, to reduce her 
to something static, pinned, like a specimen in his butterfly collection. In 
this way, there is no risk that she will be different from the image of the
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way he wants her to be. Clegg himself admits as much when he says, 
"the photographs didn't talk back at me" (109).
Whenever Miranda confronts Clegg his fear Is so great that he 
must look away. "I wanted to look at her face" he says, "at her lovely hair, 
all of her all small and pretty, but I couldn't, she stared so at me"(29). 
Clegg avoids her eyes because he does not want to see her as a person, 
does not want to see who and what she really is, as this would destroy 
his "dream" version, his fantasy. This is what Fowles must have meant 
when he claimed, in The Magus, that collecting extinguishes the moral 
Instinct (178). When a person collects something, the fact that he has It, 
possesses it, is more important than what the collected thing is in itself. 
Collecting requires no effort beyond the mere getting, no understanding 
of the thing collected on its own terms, be It a painting or whatever. The 
process Is Immoral because entirely onanistlc-masturbatory. Collecting 
is a step into the abyss of narcissism because it makes no effort to reach 
out beyond the self.
It has been noted that masturbation is prevalent in many of 
Fowles's fictions. In The Maous , Nicholas too is seen masturbating 
often. Roger Scruton, in a philosophical discussion about sexual desire, 
talks about the necessity of "interpersonal union" in a discussion that 
attempts to situate erotic love in a moral realm. Erotic love, he claims, is 
a phenomenological experience. It is phenomenal because we can 
experience it only through the phenomenon of the other. This 
phenomenal experience is corrupted if either person reifies the other.
(We can easily see in this a criticism of Sartre's warped conception of 
love.) When Scruton moves on to talk about masturbation, he divides it 
into two kinds.
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In some such way one might also distinguish the thoughts 
of the 'normal', from those of the 'perverted', masturbator. 
The latter uses representations which are purged of their 
imaginative challenge, and of all the dangers and 
difficulties that surround the sexual encounter. The sexual 
activity of the 'normal' masturbator is, primarily, a re­
creation in memory or imagination of the act towards which 
his body tends. The 'perverted' masturbator, by contrast, 
uses images as a substitute for the real thing; realistic 
representations of the body, purged of the dangers and 
difficulties presented by the human soul. (Sexual Desire 
318-19)
In other words, a "collector consciousness," by making the other an 
object, perverts everything decent about sexual love. Miranda will say 
something very close to this when Clegg asks her to pose for nude 
photographs. "You're breaking every decent human law, every decent 
human relationship, every decent thing that's ever happened between 
your sex and mine" (114).
Carol Barnum, in a Jungian interpretation of The Collector, offers 
what is a very insightful discussion of all the characters, including, Clegg. 
In holding fast to his dream version of Miranda and refusing to see her as 
a person, Clegg is what Barnum calls "anima-fixated"(44). Barnum 
believes that Miranda is '- egg's ideal feminine archetype, and that 
Clegg is frustrated in his attempts to make his idealization real. While 
this sounds plausible enough within a Jungian context, it is perhaps a 
little too deterministic within the context of the novel. Fowles’s point in all 
his fiction is that we possess a certain amount of free will. If we consider 
Clegg’s monomania, a nearer truth would be that he will not see 
Miranda as she is. Clegg’s desire is to have Miranda not as a person, 
but as a thing. Therefore, he does not want to make her real. This point 
is made by Robert Campbell when he says of Clegg, "He won't, refuses.
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to see her as a conscious subject who is constituted as a subject of her 
world; instead she is, for him, only an object in his" (quoted in Nodelman, 
334).
Although it must be clear by now that Clegg is thoroughly 
inauthentic, and further that he fails to grow existentially or morally, 
Fowles does show that Clegg is capable of some insight, even if he is 
unable to recognize the value of that insight and act upon it. One 
instance of this insight occurs in the passage where Miranda is 
suggesting to Clegg the uses to which he could put his money. Miranda, 
recognizing through his butterfly collection that Clegg is a collector, 
suggests to him that with her tutelage he could learn to collect paintings. 
And Clegg, with surprising insight-considering how thoroughly 
inauthentic he has been in so much else-reflects shortly after.
What she was asking for was someone different to me, 
someone I could never be. For instance, all that night after 
she said I could collect pictures, I thought about it; I 
dreamed myself collecting pictures, having a big house with 
famous pictures hanging on the walls, and people coming 
to see them. Miranda there, too of course. But I knew all 
the time it was silly: I’d never collect anything but butterflies. 
Pictures don't mean anything to me. I wouldn't be doing it 
because I wanted, so there wouldn't be anv point. She 
could never see that.
(80, the emphasis is mine)
We must conclude that, for Clegg, this is Insight on an enormous scale.
In essence, Clegg understands at least one aspect of what it means to be
authentic. He understands that one must be committed sincerely to any
endeavor. It is part of the tragedy in The Collector that Clegg is never
able to employ this insight in his own life. Nor, for that matter, is he able
to see these words and this truth as they apply to Miranda. In her
situation she can never love Clegg because she would not be loving
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because she wanted to. For Miranda's part, while it is true that she never 
does accept Clegg as he is, in her defense we can say that she is equally 
unwilling to accept the person that she has discovered herself to be. 
Ironically, when she tells Clegg that he must kill off his old life, she is 
articulating the cure that, in her confinement, she herself will undergo.
Miranda tries to understand Clegg, not only who he is, but who he 
was, and who he might become. We remember that Miranda asks Clegg 
about his family.. She wants Clegg to talk about them because she wants 
to try to understand him better. She even asks Clegg to read her a letter 
he has received from his aunt. Although in this episode she does make 
harsh judgements about his aunt, and although many of those 
judgements reveal Miranda’s own prejudices and limitations, her ultimate 
motive is to help Clegg.
One very sincere moment occurs when Miranda gives Clegg the 
novel The Catcher in the Rve. When she asks him his opinion of the 
book, Clegg's response reveals that he has missed the point. Miranda’s 
disappointment is clearly evident, "i gave you that book to read," she 
says, "because I thought you would feel identified with him. You’re a 
Holden Caulfield. He doesn't fit anywhere and you don't" (219).
Although we see Miranda often ’’lame-duck" Clegg, and although s^e 
does admit that escape is never very far from her mind, these moments 
by no means outweigh those times when her actions show her to be 
sincere in wanting to help Clegg in spite of everything. In reaching out to 
Clegg, Miranda is transcending her prejudiced cultural conditioning and 
acting upon a deeper motive that I have called a moral impulse. This is 
the Heraclitean insight, echoed by every great existentialist and humanist 
thinker from St. Augustine through to Jung and Maslow. When once we
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begin the journey into selfhood, we end that journey with a moral 
awareness that takes us beyond ourselves.
Miranda does understand Clegg, for from the very beginning, 
Miranda has correctly identified Clegg's problem when she thinks that "it 
must be sex "(123). To say, as does Perry Nodelman, that Clegg 
primarily desires "spiritual love" (341) from Miranda is to mistake what 
Clegg says he wants for what Clegg does. Clegg is a young man who is 
profoundly sexually repressed. In The Collector, this fact is never very 
far from the narrative. It runs through all the nice/naughty allusions, 
through Clegg's "books," and through Clegg's photography. When 
Miranda tries to seduce Clegg, to teach him that sex is another form of 
communication, of play, she is making a great sacrifice. She is giving 
herself not only physically, but emotionally. Clegg, having been brought 
to the very center of his weakness, cannot bear to face it. Rather than risk 
the sex act with Miranda, he will, a little later, ask her to pose for 
pornographic photographs instead. When, a few days after this episode, 
Miranda identifies Clegg for what he is, "a dirty little masturbating 
worm"(116), she follows this statement with another ("Oh, God, you're not 
a man"[117],) that accurately intuits Clegg's own deepest fears. While 
there can be little doubt that Miranda is being insensitive when she says 
this, she nevertheless has accurately located the source of Clegg's 
problem. Clegg is afraid to risk himself for fear that he will fail, for fear 
that he might not be "a man." It is only the static, lifekiss photographs (not 
surprisingly he likes the ones best that cut off her face) with which Clegg 
can deal because they do not require interaction with a real, live person. 
With a real, live woman, Clegg is reminded of his failures, his 
inadequacies, and his fears.
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From the earliest introduction of Miranda right up to the point 
where she lies near death, Fowles shows us a human being who is 
struggling to grow, existentially and ethically. Miranda tells us almost as 
much at the beginning of her diary: "I love life so passionately, I never 
knew how much I wanted to live before. If 1 get out of this, I shall never be 
the same (124). Perry Nodelman, in an argument that at times seems to 
have been written merely to offer a crosscurrent to the critical tide, claims 
that this and other statements Miranda makes are clichés, and reflect not 
her sincerity but her shallowness, her "snobbish disdain for just about 
everything "(335). Aside from the fact that such an interpretation seems 
unfair, it seems to me that such an attitude is not consistent with the 
context of the story as we have it. We have a young girl who has been 
brutally kidnapped, and who has a reasonable fear that she may die at 
the hands of the madman who could do such a thing. Surely we must 
read the above words-if perhaps clichéd in the quotidian world-as 
achingly sincere in her present, fearsome one.
Miranda begins to change very soon. Early in her diary she says, 
"Everything in my life seemed fine" (125). This is the kind of passage that 
those who wish to show Miranda's shallow complacency are most often 
apt to quote. But in the very same diary entry, the first diary entry, she 
begins by questioning her belief in God. "I don't know if I believe in God. 
. . .  But praying makes things easier" (126). What is immediately evident 
in the voice (and the thinking behind the voice) is its balance. It is 
indicative of a mind that is used to carrying on an internal critical 
dialogue. This capacity for internal critical debate, for the weighing and 
balancing of motives (those of the self and those of others) is, it would 
seem, a precondition for self-growth. This again, is the Heraclitean
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insight necessary before a person can move beyond the self. While we 
see Miranda engage in this debate from the very beginning of her diary, 
we never see Clegg do so. The fact that Miranda carries on an internal 
debate, believing first one thing, then something else, is in fact the best 
argument against those critics who would say Miranda does not grow. 
Miranda's growth is not linear, unendingly upward, or without fault.
Fowles takes great care to show us that Miranda's thinking, her interior 
life (as revealed to us in her diary passages), ebbs and flows, moves 
forward then retreats. Her process of growth and understanding is, in 
short, natural. We none of us learn in a perfectly linear fashion. We 
change our minds, our ideas, and our learned conventions in a halting, 
grudging fashion. Thus, Miranda can say on one page of her diary, the 
following: "I'm so superior to him. I know this sounds wickedly conceited. 
But I am . And so it's Ladymont and Boadicaea and noblesse oblige all 
over again" (137). Then, on the next page, she can change her mind:
"I'm so far from everything.. , .  From what I want to be"(138).
Another instance where Miranda displays this critical self-dialogue 
is when she shows Clegg various drawings of fruit in the attempt to teach 
him about art. She reflects on this failed attempt shortly aftenwards. "My 
fault. I was showing oti. How could he see the magic and importance of 
art (not my art, âû ) when I was so vain"(139)? Once again we see 
Miranda's capacity for self-criticism. Nodelman argues that we can no 
more trust Miranda's diary than we can Clegg's account, but to arrive at 
this statement ignores too much (332 passim). It must be clear that the 
element of self-criticism evident in Miranda and so obviously lacking in 
Clegg gives us sufficient grounds to trust the one record more than the 
other. In one of her many diary entries about G.P., Miranda concludes,
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"everything's changing. . .I’m growing up so quickly down here. Like a 
mushroom. Or is it that I've lost my sense of balance" (165)? It should be 
evident from the discussion so far that the case is just the opposite: 
Miranda is just beginning to find her balance. She is undergoing the 
movement from an understanding of the self to an understanding beyond 
the self. She is learning to balance her selfish desires against a growing 
moral impulse that teaches her of the need to reach out to others.
In spite of those critics who claim that Miranda does not grow 
(Allen, Kennedy, Nodelman), I have argued that Miranda clearly exhibits 
behavior that leads to a deeper understanding of both self and other. In 
Miranda's repeated attempts to teach Clegg, she is reaching out to him. 
This kind of action is quite different from what we could have expected of 
her before her confinement. Both my argument thus far and the growing 
critical consensus on this question must be taken as strong evidence that 
Miranda does in fact grow.
There are no doubt many ways in which we can detect growth or 
change in fictional characters. As readers, we bring with us to the work 
certain expectations. While it may be desirable that we suspend these 
expectations, at least provisionally, nonetheless they do exist and 
eventually come to the fore. Another way we detect growth is by 
comparing one character with another. The Collector allows us to do this 
quite efficiently, since it is structured in such a way that we enter into both 
characters’ minds, and, as it were, into their thought processes and 
choices. Thus, we cannot help but judge. Still another way is to 
compare characters against themselves as they evolve over the course 
of a story.
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By the time we come to read Miranda’s diary, we are able to 
measure her growth in all of the above ways. It can be argued that the 
structure of The Collector is such that, while we are able to measure 
Miranda against Clegg from the very beginning of her diary, we cannot 
measure Clegg against Miranda until after we have read Miranda's entire 
account. Our initial judgement of Clegg then is without the ambiguity in 
Miranda's character that might mitigate in some way our utter revulsion of 
Clegg. Because throughout his account Clegg is concerned with 
justifying his actions rather than discovering what they might mean, we 
conclude that Clegg fails utterly to grow. On the other hand, because we 
can measure Miranda against Clegg, we are even more aware of 
Miranda’s growth in relation to Clegg’s stasis. But most importantly for 
the purposes here, we are also able to measure Miranda against herself.
I will now argue that she grows considerably over the course of her 
confinement.
The way to do this, of couise, is to record accurately the distance 
she changes by looking at her thinking as it evolves over the course of 
her confinement. This, however, would be exhaustive. Rather, let us 
look at a few episodes that clearly show Miranda's growing awareness of 
both life's limitations and her responsibilities. There are three really 
significant ways in which we can measure Miranda's progress: her 
attitudes toward God, toward sex, and toward community.
Before we examine these three themes in Miranda's diary, there is 
one point, perhaps a bit esoteric, that will frame our discussion. At a 
point in her diary, Miranda mentions the following. "We’ve been playing 
the records he [Clegg] bought. Bartok's Music for Percussion and 
Celesta" (212). This piece of music is sometimes described by the word
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"palindrome". A palindrome is a word or poem reading the same 
backwards as fonwards. In music, it signifies a piece constructed in the 
same way, more or less loosely. In a 1937 essay on the Music for 
Strings. Percussion and Celesta. Bartok used the term "Brucken form" 
(bridge form) to describe the palindromic structure of the third movement. 
"The essence of this form, which customarily follows the five-component 
scheme ABCBA, is that the fourth and fifth sections are not just variations 
on the second and first but are recast to produce something aesthetically 
conclusive. For this structure, containing so much quasi-geometrical 
symmetry, is not static: it does not return to its origins but progresses 
towards a cathartic outcome. Thus the nature of the central section is all 
important" (Groves 2: 214).
What is important for us is the emphasis upon the central 
movement being the "bridge,” after which we find not simple retrograde 
or simple palindrome, but a new progression. Perhaps Fowles’s 
placement of this allusion to Bartok was entirely arbitrary, but it is 
fascinating nonetheless that its placement is almost exactly halfway in 
Miranda’s diary. Is the central part of her diary a bridge, after which we 
are to expect a new transformation? Discussion of the three above-noted 
themes-God, sex, and community-seems to bear this out, for in every 
theme we have a reversal of Miranda's thinking, a reversal that signifies 
a maturation in her understanding.*
Perry Nodelman has felt that the fact that Miranda prays to a God 
that she does not believe in should be counted as a limitation in her
* Miranda’s diary begins on page 123. The Bartdk allusion is on 
page 212. Miranda’s diary ends on page 279. All Miranda’s 
transformations begin after page 212.
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character (343). Yet surely it is obvious in the novel, and if we count what
Fowles says in The Aristos , that Miranda's questioning and groping
about such an enormous issue is to her credit. We need only look at the
passage to place it in its proper context. It is interesting to note as well
what it is for which she prays.
Every night I do something I haven't done for years. I lie 
and pray. I don't kneel, 1 know God despises kneelers. I lie 
and ask him to comfort M and D and Minny, and Caroline 
who must feel so guilty and everyone else." (125)
She even prays that God help Clegg ("this misery who has me under his
power") before she asks for help for herself. And after telling us she
prayed, she herself tells us of her insincerity:
I don’t know if I believe in God. I prayed to him furiously in 
the van when I thought I was going to die (that’s a proof 
against, 1 hear G. P. saying). But praying makes things 
easier. (126)
Only the most uncharitable reader (or one whose concern would be to 
prove Miranda a hypocrite) would, under the circumstances of her 
confinement, see this as Miranda's insincerity. Further proof yet that this 
passage bespeaks her merit rather than otherwise is presaged in her 
final thoughts in the first diary entry. "It's all bits and pieces. 1 can’t 
concentrate. I’ve thought so many things, and now I can’t think of one" 
(126). Though we do not know that Miranda will undergo significant 
changes at the point when she says these words, we can see upon 
reflection that they are tragically ironic in the sense that it will be as a 
result of her confinement that she will be able to concentrate, and come 
to terms with her ideas about God.
It is twenty-five pages after the Bartok allusion that Miranda 
resolves her mind concerning God. "I've been sitting here and thinking
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about God. I don't think I believe in God anymore.. . .  What 1 feel ! know 
now is that God doesn’t intervene.. . .  I see that we have to live as if there 
is no God" (239). She utters Fowles’s credo here, but the important thing 
is that she chooses: she has been able to concentrate ("I’ve felt cleaner, 
less muddled, less blind" (239). This quite clearly shows development in 
what Kerry McSweeney has called the "metaphysical dimension to her 
growth” (135).
The same halting and grudging development is evident in what I 
call the sex theme. In his treatment of this theme Fowles draws both 
characters into one "climactic episode," and in the blatant juxtaposition 
we are able to see Miranda's change all the more clearly, set, as it is, 
against Clegg's stasis.
It is not too far into Clegg’s memoir that we are shown that his only 
contact with the sexual is through magazines, those voyeuristic 
occasions while he is out collecting specimens, and his one night with a 
prostitute. At an early point in the novel Clegg confesses in his account 
that he fears he can never say or do the right thing (4). It is clear that his 
fear of failure, while no doubt in some way responsible for the stunting in 
other areas of his life, is responsible as well for his stunted sexual life. 
Fowles suggests that Clegg’s neurosis in this area is compounded by 
what Miranda calls that "weird male thing.. . .  They sulk if you don’t give, 
and hate you when you do" (262), what Karen Lever has identified as the 
"madonna/whore complex" (90). There can be no doubt that there is 
something of this neurosis in Clegg. Moreover, our earlier comments 
about Clegg as a 'perverted masturbator' carry much truth here as well. 
That is, it is not really Miranda that Clegg wants at all but only a 
substitute. Yet might we not wonder whether his failure with Miranda is
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simply another resort to convention in order to disguise his tear of life in 
almost any manifestation? We should remember all the occasions in the 
novel when Clegg has resorted to or relied upon cliché in order to 
disguise both his ignorance of something and his fear of his ignorance. 
The episode that shows this best-although it is not the clearest-is 
Miranda’s attempted seduction of Clegg,
Most commentators feel that Clegg is sexually impotent. One can 
either do it or one cannot, and ultimately, Clegg cannot. I cannot agree 
with this interpretation. Perry Nodelman makes a most useful point in an 
article I have referred to previously, when he suggests that Clegg is not 
physically impotent at all. We know he is not impotent, argues 
Nodelman, because in obeying the dim notion he has that a gentleman 
controls himself right up to the moment (as a virgin Clegg has no 
conception of what this might mean), he stands behind a curtain to hide 
his arousal. This accords with the clinical definition of impotence, which 
is the inability to achieve arousal in the presence of another. Clegg does 
achieve arousal in the presence of Miranda. If, then, Clegg is not 
physically impotent, why is he unable to consummate his passion for 
Miranda? Clearly, it must be because Clegg is psychologically and 
mentally impotent. In other words, Clegg’s real problem is his crippling 
fear. That this indeed is Clegg's real problem is borne out by the events 
following Miranda's attempted seduction. Clegg's problem stems not 
from the fact the he is impotent, but from his fear that he is impotent. This 
fear extends, as I have suggested, beyond the sexual.
In contrast to Clegg's unhealthy perversions, Miranda's attitudes 
towards sex, although ill-informed and immature, are representative of 
her age, her social class, and her experience; what she repeatedly refers
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to as "the Ladymont me." As Kerry McSweeney rightly points out, by the 
end of her diary Miranda has become very different "from the trendy 
twenty-five-year-old whom Clegg kidnapped" (134). Although Miranda 
finds thoughts of sex almost as abhorrent to her sensibilities as does 
Clegg, Fowles takes care to show us that Miranda transcends these early 
attitudes.
We see this done through Miranda’s re-appraisal of her 
relationship with the painter George Paston. When Miranda first begins 
to talk about G.P., we are made aware of her faults, her silliness, and her 
immaturity. At this early stage, G.P. is important to Miranda less for 
himself than for his flattering interest in her. In her silly, school-girlish 
way, she still finds the thought of sex with him abhorrent. She tells 
herself that it is the age difference. Yet, it is not very long before she 
amends this evaluation. But it is an episode after the Bartok allusion that 
is most indicative of her growing maturity.
The episode is the last meeting between Miranda and G.P., after 
she has come back from France and he from the Hebrides. G.P. tells her 
that he cannot see her anymore, that his peace of mind requires that he 
never see her again. The reason, he tells her, is that he is in love with 
her. in the following pages, Miranda analyses her feelings, revealing the 
following thoughts. "1 thought I knew 1 didn’t love him. I'd won that game. 
And what has happened since?" (233). On the next page she says, "All 
that time I kept thinking, do I love him? Then, obviously, there was so 
much doubt, I couldn't. And now I have to write down what 1 feel now. 
Because I have changed again. I know it. I feel it" (234). What is 
interesting is the way in which her transformation takes place. Miranda 
does not deliberately try to see G.P. in a new light. It is as a result of the
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insight she gains into herself, into her ideas and into what is newiy 
important to her that allows her to begin to think of G.P. in a new way. 
Fowles's handling of this is masterful. fVliranda's acceptance of G.P. is 
symbolic of her growing moral awareness and her maturing vision of life.
Before we leave the discussion of the sex theme, I want to shed 
light on what we might cali a shadow discussion of the sex theme.
Fowles has Miranda relate a conversation she has had with her sister 
Minny while they were on a summer holiday in Spain. The discussion 
centers on Miranda’s boyfriend Piers, and about what a shame it is that 
he has a beautiful body but a rotten mind. We must ask ourselves in 
what way this seemingly trite discussion is relevant to the story. I believe 
that in this episode Fowles is making a statement about art. After some 
jesting, Minny, offers Miranda the following words: "Bodies beat minds" 
(214). She is here being purposefully ironic, for what she really means, 
and what Miranda sees, is that they both value minds over bodies. In her 
reflection, which is her diary, Miranda realizes that she could never love 
someone for just the body; for her it must be, "minds beat bodies." If we 
let these words run free a little from their tenor, the vehicle might say 
something about art. In both life and art, content mattem as much as or 
perhaps more than form. What we say and what we do should in some 
way ennoble life. We can hear in this the not too distant echo of a moral 
prescription. Miranda’s ultimate acceptance of G.P., ("I shall be hurt, 
battered and buffeted. But it will be like being in a gale of light, after this 
black hole" [266]), is symbolic of Miranda's maturation in the sex theme.
Although I am going to close this discussion with some final 
remarks about the community theme, it should be obvious that much of
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this chapter has, in one way and another, been a discussion about this 
theme.
Miranda, from the earliest period of her confinement, seeks to 
teach Clegg. According to the Heraclitean paradigm 1 have been 
suggesting, this behavior of Miranda's typifies an outward movement into 
community that is arrived at only after an inward movement toward 
selfhood. In her attempts to teach Clegg, Miranda displays a burgeoning 
awareness of the moral impulse. Through her discussion of books, of 
drawings and paintings, of music, and of ideas, Miranda attempts to 
reach out to Clegg. Tragically for them both, Clegg will not be reached 
by any of these means. In a final attempt to bridge the gulf between them 
that she has not been able to bridge by any other means. Miranda 
decides through self-sacrifice to try to teach Clegg the difference 
between love and sex. It should not escape us that in the very act of 
doing so, she is teaching herself. We might see In the climax of this 
episode the climax of both the the sex theme and the community theme.
Miranda, with a mixture of pity, charity and responsibility (this last 
to herself as much as to Clegg), makes the physical offering of herself: 
she tries physically to bridge the gulf between them that she has not 
been able to bridge mentally. This point is absolutely certain if we have 
been sensitive to her growing maturity. She confronts all her own fears 
about sex in order to help Clegg confront his own about the same. While 
doing so, she reaches out to Clegg as never before. As she says herself, 
"Nobody could ever understand how much I put into yesterday. The effort 
of giving, of risking, of understanding" (262). We see Miranda succeed 
while in the same moment we see Clegg fail. Clegg, fearful that he does 
not know what to do, what to feel, or how to act, ultimately breaks away
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from contact with Miranda, and just as earlier in the novel when he lies in 
order to hide from the responsibility of her capture, he lies again (telling 
the story about the war psychiatrist) to hide the truth of his crippling fear. 
Clegg is not so much physically impotent as he is mentally impotent.
In all the themes, the God theme, the sex theme, and the 
community theme, Miranda's new attitudes follow the Bartok quotation. 
They all change dramatically and are resolved, as Bartok stated they 
should be, in an aesthetic conclusiveness that does not merely invert 
what went before, but presents something new. Miranda, journeying into 
selfhood, has recognized and acted upon the moral impulse to move 
beyond herself. The great tragedy of The Collector is that Clegg has not.
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I went in search of myself.
It belongs to all men to know themselves and to think well.
Heraclitus, XXVIII, XXIV
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The Maçus is one of those novels that conform to Nabokov’s 
widely known dictum: it is a novel that cannot be read, only re-read. It is 
hard to imagine even a very good reader being able to assimilate all that 
there is in the novel in only one reading. Ultimately, the myriad stories 
and masques, allusions and metaphors become too much, and the 
reader is simply overwhelmed. Perhaps this is one kind of reading 
experience that The Maous seeks to provide, for one of the themes in the 
novel concerns the destruction of a naive belief in a completely ordered 
reality and the need to accept life as more contingent than many of us 
would like to believe.
Yet anyone who has had either the leisure or necessity to reread 
The Maous soon begins to be aware that there is some sense of 
coherency to all the various stories in the novel, and further that as these 
various episodes begin to cohere, they add considerably to the overall 
meaning of the novel in general, and to the process of enlightenment of 
the main protagonist in particular.
While much of the early criticism on The Maous concentrated upon 
exegesis of the many events of the Phraxos section of the novel, recent 
criticism has tended to view these events with greater reference to the 
relationship between Nicholas and Alison. Both Kerry McSween ey (123) 
and Simon Loveday (29 passim) have emphasized that the most 
important story in The Magus is the story of Nicholas and Alison's 
relationship. I concur with this emphasis. I shall therefore look not only 
at the ways in which Nicholas is inauthentic, but also at the way 
Conchis's four stories influence his development, and lead him, by the 
end of the story, to appreciate Alison. This is the Heraclitean paradigm:
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Nicholas makes the inward movement first, and then gains the 
awareness to make the outward movement.
When we first meet Nicholas, he is the epitome of the inauthentic 
person. His little learning has given him the assumption of belonging to 
a unique caste. Not only is Nicholas not very authentic; he has 
accumulated a number of attitudes and poses which effectively prevent 
him from achieving any kind of real meaning in his life. Fowles 
underscores Nicholas's inauthenticity by involving him romantically with 
someone of very opposite character. Alison Kelly, the Australian girl that 
Nicholas meets In the first part of the novel, functions not only as a 
contrast to Nicholas but as a kind of test as well: ultimately, we measure 
Nicholas's growth by the degree that he is able to connect with her.
There is an important point central to the discussion of Nicholas's 
authenticity. While much of what Nicholas needs to learn is conveyed to 
us in the language and concepts of contemporary existentialism, we must 
not see in this, as have some critics, an uncritical endorsement of modern 
existentialism. Nicholas's misunderstanding of modern existentialist 
doctrine can in fact be seen as a criticism of both the danger inherent in 
the modern expression of existentialism and its limitations. The modern 
existentialist expression is too unbalanced; it emphasizes the expression 
of the self at the expense of or without regard to the other. In this there is 
the danger of falling prey to the very real narcissistic abyss that opens 
before us. Too few critics have sufficiently seen The Magus from this 
perspective. This is especially true concerning the concept of freedom. 
David Walker is almost alone in not identifying Fowles's very real 
concerns about the nature of freedom with the kinds of freedom explored 
in the novel, especially Conchis's freedom, Conchis's expression of
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freedom in the Eleutheria episode must not be seen as normative, which 
is the way it has often been discussed. Conchis sacrifices the iives of 
eighty hostages and even risks his own life for the principle of absolute 
freedom. Should we not question the foundation of such an absolute 
principle? Conchis himself claims that the weight of those eighty lives 
has come back to him again and again. 1 suggest that they should, and 
that, equally, they should weigh upon the mind of the reader. A 
statement by Fowles himself in the preface to the revised edition of The 
Magus seems to suggest that Conchis's kind of freedom Is far less 
unequivocal than has been presumed. He says, "I do not defend 
Conchis's decision at the execution, but I defend the reality of the 
dilemma" (10).
The Magus, then, is not so much an endorsement of its many 
themes but a forum where values such as freedom and reason, and 
concepts of self and other can be explored. The Magus is as much a 
journey for Fowies's readers as it is his inauthentic characters. The novel 
teaches us to balance the needs of the self against the needs of others.
In my discussion of The Magus I v .1 show that Nicholas moves toward a 
greater understanding of the need for this balance, first by understanding 
himself-curbing his individual and selfish caprice-and then by 
understanding his need to go beyond the self, shown by his desire to 
reconnect with Alison.
Nicholas is introduced to us as a middle-ciass young man who, 
with his Oxbridge education and his social and cultural refinement, quite 
plainly sees himself as one of the Few in human society, a member of the 
"dominant hundred-thousand" (16). Behind Nicholas's conception is the 
distinction between the Few and the Many. We vviil see in the person of
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Nicholas proof of Fowles's injunction that "ttie dividing line between the 
Few and the Many must run through each individual, not between 
individuals" (The Aristos 9-10, the emphasis is mine). Socially and 
intellectually, Nicholas may belong to the Few, but morally, as he quickly 
reveals to us in his behaviour, he is of the Many. In this he is similar to 
Miranda. In order to become a better person, he too must kill much of his 
past, transcend his "smog of opinions" (The Aristos 53). Yet there is a 
difference between Miranda and Nicholas, and this difference 
underscores the danger and the difficulty of killing the past. Miranda, as 
she begins to gain awareness, is able to recall from memory the lessons 
that G. P. had been trying to teach her. Nicholas has not yet met his G. 
P .-he  has not yet met Conchis. As The Magus opens, Nicholas tells us 
that he had killed his family in a psychological sense, eradicated the 
opinions and conventions that they stood for, but he does not know what 
to replace them with. As he says early on, "I had got away from what I 
hated, but I hadn’t found where I loved, and so I pretended that there was 
nowhere to love" (17).
In the absence of meaningful values, Nicholas makes a value out 
of style. This strategy is very evident in the short chapter in which he 
recounts for us something of his personal history. Of his days as a 
student at Oxford, he tells us that he tried to create an identity.
I was strong on the discipline in vogue.
At least, along with a group of fellow odd men out at 
Magdalen, 1 thought I was so. We formed a small club 
called Les Hommes Revoltes , drank very dry sherry, and 
(as a protest against those shabby duffle-coated last years 
of the ‘forties) wore dark-grey suits and black ties for our 
meetings. There we argued about being and nothingness 
and called a certain type of inconsequential behavior 
'existentialist'. Less nlightened people would have called 
it capricious or just plain selfish; but we didn't understand
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that the heroes, or anti-heroes, of the French existentialist 
novels we read were not supposed to be realistic. We tried 
to imitate them, mistaking metaphorical descriptions of 
complex modes of feeling for straightforward prescriptions 
of behaviour. We duly felt the right anguishes. Most of us, 
true to the eternal dandyism of Oxford, simply wanted to 
look different. In our club, we did.(17)
The first aspect about this passage that we should notice is the tone. The
story is told by Nicholas retrospectively, and the tone reveals that as he
speaks these words he has considerable insight into the person he used
to be. Ironically, Nicholas was thoroughly inauthentic in his attempt to be
authentic, because as he tells us, he had confused "descriptions of
complex modes of feeling for straightforward prescriptions of behaviour."
Nicholas is acting a role, pretending to be something he is not. He has
developed a persona that allows him to feel that he has an identity.
Let us compare this aspect of Nicholas with a passage from The 
Aristos. In that book Fowles says,
The nemo is a man's sense of his own futility and 
ephemerality.. . .  I can counter my nemo by conflicting, by 
adopting my own special style of life. I build up an 
elaborate unique persona, I defy the mass. I am the 
bohemian, the dandy, the outsider, the hippy. (49-50)
In light of this passage, it appears that Nicholas may be trying to defeat 
his sense of the nemo. This is confirmed by another passage where, 
once again, Nicholas retrospectively reveals that he has emphasized 
form over content.
At school i got a small reputation as a wartime aesthete and 
cynic.. . .  I acquired expensive habits and affected 
manners. I got a third-class degree and a first-class illusion: 
that I was a poet. But nothing could have been less poetic 
than my seeing-through-all boredom with life in general and 
with making a living in particular. I was too green to know 
that all cynicism masks a failure to cope-an impotence, in 
short, and that to despise all effort is the greatest of al l . . . .  In 
truth i was not a cynic by nature; only by revolt. (16-17)
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We gain several important insights into Nicholas's character from this 
passage. Firstiy, Nicholas's impotence derives from a place similar to 
Clegg's: it is an impotence derived in part by fear. Nicholas is a young 
man who does not know where he is going, and to hide this fact and his 
anxiety about it, he adopts a pose, a mask. Nicholas claims as well that 
he was an aesthete and a cynic. The word "aesthete" is of course related 
to the word "aesthetic." The attitudes of both the aesthete and the cynic 
require of the bearer to affect a style. One must strike all the right poses 
and engage in particular, almost ritualized behavior. Ironically, acting 
within such confines proscribes the very thing that Nicholas claims, as an 
Homme Révolté , he possesses: freedom. Nicholas's existence is an 
exaggeration of style, and his style is not who he is but his illusions of 
who he is. In existentialist terms, Nicholas is inauthentic. Yet we must 
not conclude that in Nicholas’s overly-aesthetic sensibility the novel Is 
condemning the aesthetic per se. Frederick M. Holmes, in "Art, Truth, 
and John Fowles’s The Magus." perceptively argues this issue. "Urfe's 
bad faith," asserts Holmes, "is the result not of a substitution of art for life 
but of a failure to integrate the various interpretive strategies for making 
sense of life" (51). One aspect of Nicholas’s inauthenticity, then, lies not 
in his aestheticizing of life but in his compartmentalizing of life.
Nicholas’s conception of the aesthetic is too narrow, very near that of the 
"homme sensual," and therefore excludes the moral. Nicholas's 
aesthetic posturing is irresponsible. In this state, Nicholas falsifies both 
his experience of the aesthetic and of reality.
Nicholas's character, then, is confirmed for us from the beginning. 
When we begin to see how he treats Alison in their relationship-as 
someone or something at a remove-we are little surprised. An episode
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that shows Nicholas's inauthentic behaviour in the way we have 
discussed comes very early in the novel. After having briefly met each 
other at a party, Nicholas and Alison spend the night together, and must 
awkwardly face each other in the morning. The conversation reveals 
much about both characters, but particularly Alison, who initiates real 
communication (as she had done the previous night : "Let’s cut corners. 
To hell with literature. You’re clever and I'm beautiful. Now let's talk 
about who we really are" [26]), with the following:
'You don't know what it's like waking up with a man you 
didn't even know this time yesterday. It's losing something. 
Not just what all girls lose.'
‘Or gaining something.'
'God, what can we gain. Tell me.’
'Experience. Pleasure.' (30)
Alison has personalized the act of making love so that, for her, to wake 
up facing someone she does not really know-literally facing a 
depersonalized situation-causes her anxiety about what kind of person 
she is. Nicholas, who has a history of depersonalizing his love affairs, 
sees what has happened between them in objective terms: it was 
"experience," it was "pleasurable." Nicholas objectifies even human 
contact and in doing so diminishes genuine meaning by pushing his 
experience into the aesthetic realm.
Again we see Nicholas existing under the influence of the life­
style.
Alison, unlike Nicholas, makes no declaration of life-style to show that 
she is authentic, is genuinely authentic. Nicholas's lack of knowledge 
about himself and his illusions about everything else will prevent him 
from achieving any kind of meaningful relationship with Alison.
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This inability of Nicholas's to feel, or rath«r his habit of not allowing 
himself to feel, is not unknown to Alison. After having attended Game's 
film Quai des Brumes , Alison begins to cry, and then cries once again 
when they are back at their apartment. She senses Nicholas's 
disapproval and remarks:
‘You’re not me. You can’t feel like I feei.’
‘I can feel.'
‘No, you can’t. You just choose not to feel or something, 
and everything's fine.' (34)
This is one of many occasions where Aiison shows that she knows
Nicholas better than he knows himself. The point is that Nichoias does
not feel.
When Nicholas does have feelings, he is either unwilling to act 
upon them or unable to understand them. He shows his unwillingness to 
act upon his feelings in several scenes where he and Alison are 
discussing their future plans.
One day she said, ‘I've got to go for my interview tomorrow.’
‘Do you want to go?'
‘Do you want me to go?'
‘It doesn't mean anything. You haven’t got to make up 
your mind.’
‘It'll do me good if I get accepted. Just to know I’m 
accepted.'
She changed the subject; and I could have refused to 
change the subiect. But I didn't. (36-37, the emphasis is 
mine)
Nicholas is aware of the implications that Alison’s interview has for their 
relationship. But he refuses to confront the real issue of whether they 
should make a commitment to each other because he is unwilling to 
make such a commitment. This is confirmed again shortly after.
I asked her what she'd been doing while I was away.
'Writing a letter.'
‘To them?'




‘What do you think I said?'
‘You accepted.'
There was a difficult pause. 1 knew what she wanted me 
to say, but I couldn't say it. I felt as a sleepwalker must feel 
when he wakes up at the end of the roof parapet. 1 wasn’t 
ready for marriage, for settling down. 1 wasn’t 
psychologically close enough to her; something 1 couldn't 
define, obscure, monstrous, lay between us, and this 
obscure monstrous thing emanated from her, not from me, 
(37)
Nicholas refuses to admit to himself that the "monstrous thing" lying 
between them is love, never mind admit that it is something that he feels 
as well. He gives himself away a little later, when, referring to Alison's 
obviously false but game attempt to be joyful about the news confirming 
his teaching job, he says, "I was too much of a coward to stop and think 
why 1 was secretly hurt by her refusing to take it seriously" (38).
Nicholas’s cowardice is the cowardice to face up to the reality of his 
feelings. Nicholas is aware that their relationship has become serious, 
that Alison loves him, but because he mistakenly thinks love violates the 
code of behaviour of the existential anti-hero, he has quelled any similar 
feelings he might have had himself. In other words, in a cowardly and 
Inauthentic way, he avoids the issue of "what next?" in his relationship 
with Alison.
The episode that shows Nicholas's inauthenticity better than any 
other is that which depicts him and Alison at the Tate gai’leiy.
Alison was slightly leaning against me, holding my hand . . .  
[and]. . .  I suddenly had a feeling that we were one body, 
one person, even there; that if she disappeared it would 
have been as if I had lost half of myself. A terrible deathlike 
feeling, which anyone less cerebral and self-absorbed than 
I was then would have realized was simply love. I thought it 
was desire. 1 drove her straight home and tore her ciothes 
off. (35)
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Not only does Nicholas not understand or recognize his feelings of love, 
but he mistakes love for sex. Nicholas's confusion of these two feelings, 
grounded in his narcissism, prevents him from recognizing Alison’s true 
worth. Later in the story, this same confusion will prevent him from 
understanding his feelings for Julie (selfishly narcissistic), this time 
mistaking sex for love.
The final point to note about Nicholas in the context of his
inauthenticity is his attitude toward mystery, it is instructive to recall
Nicholas's early attitudes toward mystery. The first mention of mystery
occurs early in the novel, when he decides to leave the school at which
he has been teaching in East Anglia.
It poured with rain the day I left. But I was filled with 
excitement, a strange exuberant sense of taking wing. 1 
didn’t know where I was going, but I knew what I needed. I 
needed a new land, a new race, a new language; and 
although I couldn't have put it into words then, I needed a 
new mystery. (19)
The main reason he leaves, Nicholas tells us, is that he is 
surrounded by an atmosphere of failure and people who project an aura 
of defeat. Almost offhandedly, he mentions that there was also "a girl I 
was tired of" (18). While we cannot altogether dismiss his other reasons, 
we need only consider his later treatment of Alison to suspect, upon 
reflection, that Nicholas is really running away from fear: fear of both the 
girl and what he might become. Nicholas alleviates this fear by seeking 
out the new, the virgin experience.
It is not really mystery that Nicholas seeks, but a selfish pursuit of 
the new, and a running away from the old, the known. We again 
encounter the same optimism after he has, on Bourani, met Conchis. 
"The truth" he says, "was that I was full of a green stir. Conchis was no
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more than the chance agent, the event that had come at the right time; 
just as in the old days I might, after a celibate term at Oxford, have met a 
girl and begun an affair with her, I had begun something exciting with 
him" (102). Again, we see that Nicholas surrounds mystery with a sense 
of benevolent adventure. We must see in his actions not only a 
selfishness, but a smug complacency about mystery, especially when the 
mystery is under his control. Nicholas always looks favorably upon 
mystery when he is looking at it from solid ground. In his relationships 
with women, he either falsifies his feelings, or, as in the case of Alison, 
refuses even to admit to his real feelings, Nicholas withholds his 
feelings, shifting the solitary heart, keeping power in order to keep 
control. With Conchis, he initially enjoys the mysteries with a sense that 
the mounting of the illusions is a flattering tribute.
As the events on Bourani become more elaborate (and to 
Nicholas less benevolent), he becomes less sure that he is in control. 
This sense of not being in control brings out Nicholas's true feelings 
before mystery: he, like humankind, is fearful of mystery. In fact,
Nicholas is so ill at ease that, when the events of Conchis's masques 
become too much for his reason, he reacts time and again with 
aggression. Nicholas continually wants to know what is behind 
everything on Bourani, what it all means. He wants always to know why. 
"I'd enjoy it all the more," he says to Conchis, "if I knew what it all meant" 
(185). Rationalism seeks to destroy not only mystery but hazard as well. 
Nicholas clings to his reason because he wants his absolutes. In this, 
Fowles suggests that Nicholas is very similar to many people. We enjoy 
mystery as long as we feel that we have some control over it; that it is in 
bounds. But mystery, by its nature, is full of possibility, full of hazard.
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They are at times, almost the same. "Unknowing, or hazard, is as vital to 
man as water," Fowles says in The Aristos (27). Nicholas’s Insistent 
rationalism, and his false notions of mystery, are aspects of his 
personality that Conchis tries, through his Godgame, to amend. The 
theme of reason versus mystery focuses much of the action in The 
Magus, and becomes one of the cardinal lessons in Conchis's four life- 
stories.
In talking about Nicholas’s inauthenticity, 1 have discussed it 
primarily by looking at Nicholas's actions on their own. We might also 
contrast his inauthenticity with Alison's authenticity. One episode where 
this contrast is very clear is in the narration of their respective moments of 
existential angst.
In the first few months of his teaching term on the island of 
Phraxos, Nicholas becomes despondent and feels that his life is 
worthless. The primary reason for his despondency is the realization that 
he is not a poet. But though this is perhaps his most recent failure, he 
brings to rollcall many other failures that contribute to his despair: his 
syphilis, his failed past romances, and all the death that has marked his 
family. In high dramatic fashion, Nicholas goes alone into the Greek hills 
with the notion of committing suicide. The entire scene has an intense 
literary quality. At first Nicholas places the loaded gun against his eye, 
methodically rehearsing the gruesome act. Next, with the gun unloaded, 
he tests the firing mechanism. Once again he loads the gun and points it 
at his head. The g un barrel itself becomes the "black O" of his non­
existence. With the gun pointed at his head, he waits for the black 
moment. As he waits, he hears the siren of an Athens boat that recalls 
the earlier voice of the young peasant girl singing. Ultimately, Nicholas
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waits too long; the moment is lost, or rather it is transformed from an
existential moment to a literary one.
I waited for the will, the black moment, to come to raise my 
feet and kick down; and I could not. All the time 1 felt I was 
being watched, that 1 was not alone, that 1 was putting on an 
act for the benefit of someone.. . .  1 was trying to commit not 
a moral action, but a fundamentally aesthetic one; to do 
something that would end my life sensationally, 
significantly, consistently" (62, the emphas's is mine).
Even Nicholas's existential angst Is theatrical, a mere pose, an aesthetic 
impulse. As he himself says, "1 had been, and remained, intensely 
depressed, but I had also been, and always would be, intensely false; in 
existentialist terms, inauthentic" (62). It is not so much the 
meaninglessness of existence that drives Nicholas to attempt the act of 
suicide as it is his failure to cope with quotidian existence. His final 
words are revealing. He sees in the fact that he tries to commit not a 
moral action but a fundamentally aesthetic one a consistency in his 
character.
With Alison, we have this process related much differently. 
Whereas the episode of Nicholas's existential despair is highly literary 
and described over several pages, Alison's is rather short, and done in 
dialogue. Instead of highly orchestrated art, we have described a subtle 
and genuine moment from reality.
One evening we went to see Game's old film Quai des 
Brumes . She was crying when we came out and she 
began to cry again when we were in bed. She sensed my 
disapproval.
‘You’re not me. You can't feel like 1 feel.'
‘1 can fee!.’
‘No, you can’t. You just choose not to feel or something, 
and everything’s fine.'
‘It's not fine. It's just not so bad.’
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‘That film made me feel what I feel about everything.
There isn’t any meaning. You try and tiy to be happy and 
then something chance happens and it's all gone. It’s 
because we don't believe in a life after death.'
‘Not don't. Can't.'
‘Every time you go out and I'm not with you I think you 
may die. I think about dying every day. Every time I have 
you, I think this is one in the eye for death. You know, 
you've got a lot of money and the shops are going to shut in 
an hour. It's sick, but you've got to spend. Does that make 
sense?'
‘Of course. The bomb.'
‘It's not the bomb. It's us.' (34)
Alison's "It’s us" is open to at least two interpretations, possibly more. In 
one sense, she is referring to their relationship. Alison is aware of the 
connections between people, and the tenuity of such connections, in 
light of her profoundly-felt sense of human contingency, makes those 
connections all the much more precious. The second sense is that she is 
referring to the human condition in general. In this sense, Alison is 
aware of the ephemerality of human existence. Regardless of which way 
we read it, what is clear is that she feels genuine angst here, a sense of 
the hazardousness of existence. She also feels, on some intuitive level, 
the need to preserve the one true connection that enables human beings 
to mitigate this anxiety. She understands that although the human 
condition is one of ultimate existential aloneness, a balm to this 
aloneness is the bridges we build through love.
Aside from showing Alison to be more genuine and more in touch 
with herself and her feelings than Nicholas, this episode is also an 
example of the theme of self and other, individual and community. 
Nicholas, at this stage of the novel, does not understand the need to 
balance these because he is as yet unaware of his own selfishness.
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As I have shown, when Nicholas has insight into his feelings, or 
when he begins to feel, he always brushes these feelings aside or 
refuses to act upon them. The times when his feelings are genuine, he 
deceives himself about their meaning. At his initial meeting with Alison, 
we notice he talks about her qualities, her candor, her ability to flash out 
some truth, some seriousness (27), but although aware of these, he 
apparently gives them small currency in his thoughts for her.
Alison, when we first meet her, is shown to us as someone who is 
aware of her feelings. She may not be able to articulate her deeper 
emotions or even understand them in the existential language that 
Nicholas has adopted, but she always follows her feelings through a kind 
of intuitive wisdom. From what is said by Conchis elsewhere in the 
novel, we might conclude that ways of knowing that fall outside the 
parameters of logic and reason are at times more valid than reason (the 
limitations of which Nicholas is yet to learn). We see her also as 
someone who is aware-again, perhaps on not a completely conscious 
level-of the need to build relationships beyond the self. She feels the 
need to make genuine connections with others.
Quite clearly, Nicholas is a man who is under many illusions, both 
about himself and about the world. His "existential" seriousness is a 
pose. He avoids love and any kind of connection with others as he 
avoids so much else in life. Instead, he turns reality into false art, and 
real feelings into artifice.
The first section of The Magus has shown us who and what 
Nicholas is. It is the second section, long and convoluted,that has always 
attracted the most commentary from critics. The tripartite design of The 
Magus suggests a magic metaphor. We are first shown Nicholas as he is
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(London): then, as in a magic act, we witness a considerable amount of 
hocus-pocus and smoke (Greece and the Bourani experience); and 
finally, we are presented with Nicholas changed by his experience 
(London). The hocus-pocus part in any conjuror’s act Is the magic, and 
we risk spoiling the trick for the truth if we are too intent on peeking 
behind the wizard's curtain. But this is not to say that we should refrain 
from speaking about the events on Phraxos altogether, only that we 
should recognize that their first importance must be considered in 
relation to Nicholas's heuristic education.
Simon Loveday, in The Romances of John Fowles. has suggested 
an elaborate schema for The Magus . In this schema, he identifies the 
four stories or experiences of life that Conchis relates to Nicholas as 
central to the story (47). The stories comprise events from the following 
four episodes in Conchis's life: Neuve Chapelle, de Deukans,
Seidevarre, and the Eleutheria man. The two stories from the wars-the 
two most significant events affecting humankind in this century-provide 
for Conchis (and Fowles) events around which to develop a discussion of 
several important human issues: existence, mortality, hazard or chance, 
and morality. The other two stories, de Deukans and Seidevarre, 
express ideas that are close to Fowles personally: collector 
consciousness and respect for mystery.
Aside from these stories that Conchis tells, there is the Bourani 
experience. Although there are several masques, and although they 
each are intended to teach Nicholas different aspects about himself or 
his situation, I include them under the general term since they all have 
one thing in common: they are all illusions. Conchis is Nicholas's reality 
instructor, and all the masques, while teaching different lessons, amount
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to the teaching of one grand lesson: that however much people prefer 
the illusion, and however much they try to maintain their illusions, the 
illusions are always destructive if they prevent people from living full lives 
in a vital reality. People must force themselves, through an exercise of 
will, everyday, to choose reality. This is precisely what Heraclitus sought 
to teach as well. In his metaphor of those who are awake and those who 
are asleep, he correctly divined the condition of the human race. He 
taught that if we turned inward, we could find our true selves. This was 
his reveille to all those people, the many, who too often prefer the dream 
to reality. Time and again we will see Nicholas, like Conchis's octopus, 
prefer the illusion to reality. For Nicholas, choosing reality is ultimately 
symbolized by his choosing Alison.
Conchis's first story of his past with Lily and the First World War 
serve,> a number of purposes. Conchis, too, knows Nicholas better than 
Nich''''-' knows himself. This is aptly demonstrated in the way he uses 
Lily,v . seduce Nicholas into the Godgame. We remember that 
Nicholas, existing as he does in a fashionable ennuie , is repelled by the 
quotidian. We also remember that Lily seduces Nicholas’s imagination 
first. Conchis has Nicholas first meet Julie as Lily, and by doing so, he 
entrances Nicholas by the one sure way he knows Nicholas cannot 
resist: he presents Lily in an elaborate Edwardian masque, knowing that 
this will appeal to Nicholas's exaggeratedly aesthetic mind. He presents 
Lily to Nicholas as an ideal.
Once Conchis has Nicholas's attention, he begins to teach him, 
via the stories, lessons he has determined that Nicholas must learn. One 
purpose of the Neuve Chapelle story is for Conchis to establish the main 
point in his version of humankind’s existential condition. God, Conchis
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says, does not exist; all is hazard. We find this idea repeated throughout 
The Maaus. Conchis describes a scene where his regiment has been 
ordered to attack a German position to gain ground, and the ensuing 
slaughter of life. The event generates the following thoughts for Conchis.
I saw that this cataclysm must be an expiation for some 
barbarous crime of civilization, some terrible human lie. 
What the lie was, I had too little knowledge of history or 
science to know then. 1 know now it was our believing that 
we were fulfilling some end, serving some plan-that all 
would come out well in the end, because there was some 
great plan over all. Instead of the reality. There is no plan. 
Ail is hazard. And the only thing that will preserve us is 
ourselves. (129)
One corollary of the proposition that there is no God is that we are no 
longer governed. Therefore, we must learn to govern ourselves. The 
governance of the self becomes then a profound responsibility. That we 
must enter into the fray and flux of life and that we must make choices 
that do not betray the responsibilities of self, is Conchis's first lesson. 
Although Nicholas has adopted the outward guise of the existential man, 
he has remained inauthentic, in part because he has avoided 
responsibility.
One example where Nicholas does not understand personal 
responsibility is revealed in the discussion of self between him and 
Conchis. Defending his pessimism to Conchis, Nicholas suggests that 
he and his generation must collectively assume the guilt for Neuve 
Chapelle and Hiroshima. Conchis points out that this a false assumption 
of guilt.
‘But you and II We live, we are this wonderful age. We are 
not destroyed. We did not even destroy.'
‘No man is an island.'
‘Pah. Rubbish. Every one of us is an island. If it were not 
so we should go mad at once. Between these islands are
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ships, aeroplanes, telephones, wireless-what you will. But 
they remain islands. Islands that can sink or disappear for 
ever. You are an island that has not sunk.' (146)
By combatting Nicholas's false notions of guilt, Conchis tries to make him
aware of the true nature of personal responsibility. Later, in another
sententious speech, Conchis tries to instill n Nicholas the same lesson.
"The human race is unimportant. It is the self that must not be betrayed".
Nicholas, like a chess player thinking he has made a good move,
answers "I suppose, one could say that Hitler didn't betray his self."
Conchis then mates with the following. "You are right. He did not. But
millions of Germans did betray their selves. That was the tragedy. Not
that one man had the courage to be evil. But that millions had not the
courage to be good" (132). The German people relinquished
responsibility for their selves by giving it to Hitler, who, though Conchis
does not say this, was merely another form of God. Nicholas must learn
to separate personal guilt from collective guilt, and then accept
responsibility for the self.
Right from the first story, then, Conchis begins to work upon 
Nicholas, destroying his false illusions and replacing them with the 
lessons he has determined Nicholas must learn.
It might be worth pointing out here that Conchis's lessons are not 
sown upon entirely infertile ground. Although it appears that Nicholas 
learns slowly, and at great pain to himself, he nevertheless does learn. 
Nicholas is no Clegg. Nicholas does have some understanding of 
existentialist thought, and he has the capacity of self-criticism. He is 
aware that he must try to be authentic. Nicholas’s problem is that he 
lacks a comprehension of authenticity and at the same time he is reason- 
ridden. He has no appreciation of the contingent in life. Nicholas, in his
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narcissistic pursuit of the "life-style," has been blind to any vision of the 
world other than his own.
The next major story which Conchis relates to Nicholas is the story 
of de Deukans. While critics have always had much to say about the last 
story, the Eleutheria story, the de Deukans story has often received the 
least attention. It is in the story of de Deukans that Conchis tries to show 
Nicholas the danger of a life that is too narrowly aesthetic, and thus a 
perversion of a necessary and vital aesthetic.
Among the details Conchis gives Nicholas of his early life is the 
period of his medical school days and his co-founding of the Society for 
Reason. It was at this time that Conchis first made the acquaintance of 
the older man, de Deukans. Conchis describes for Nicholas his arrival 
at de Deukans’ chateau-Givray-le-Duc-in the eastern part of France.
The description evokes a scene of still perfection, as Conchis calls it, a 
"mise en paysage ," that in the hearing seems almost too idyllic to be 
real. Conchis tells Nicholas how this scene affected him. He was in two 
minds: as a socialist, he was shocked, but as a "homme sensual" he 
was ravished (177). Nevertheless, Conchis is able to come to a 
conclusion about de Deukans and his world. "De Deukans” says 
Conchis, "by being as he was-certainiy not by arguing-raised profound 
doubts in my philosophy. Doubts he was later to crystallize for me, as I 
will tell you, in five simple words" (179).
Before we look at the five simple words, we must understand 
clearly the philosophy that Conchis held at this time, a philosophy, he 
says, that was put in doubt. Conchis says that he was a "would be 
socialist." Yet there is something here that is not right, if de Deukans- 
living in the wealth of an unnatural and impossible perfect world.
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oblivious to the natural but possible imperfect world-raises doubts for 
Conchis the socialist, the selfishness of de Deukans' world should 
confirm for Conchis his socialist credo. Why then would Conchis say that 
de Deukans and his world raised in him profound doubts?
To answer this question, we need first to look to what Fowles has 
said in The Aristos . In the chapter, "Other Philosophies," Fowles 
discusses socialism in part by contrasting it with Christianity. Earlier he 
has criticized Christianity for its use and abuse of the notion of an 
afteriife. He says of socialism:
Socialism has its afterlife myth, not in a hypothetical other 
other world, but in a hypothetical future of this world.
Marxism and Leninism both proclaim, use and abuse the 
notion of perfectibility; justifying bad means by good ends. 
(117)
The goal of socialism is to achieve a perfect world in this world; a heaven 
on earth. But the danger in this is as Fowles relates in the above 
quotation is that too often bad means are used to achieve good ends. In 
his acquaintance with de Deukans and Givray-ie-Duc, Conchis has 
encountered a man trying to maintain a perfect world. But in his attempt 
to maintain a perfect world, de Deukans has extinguished in himself any 
vestiges of a moral instinct. In his eyes, peasants toiling on the land 
become a scene from a Millet painting. Life gets reduced to an aesthetic 
experience. Life becomes art. When the world is seen as a series of 
collected things, we too easily objectify not only things, but people too. 
Any true connection possible between the self and others breaks down. 
Eventually, everything begins and ends with the self. Conchis’s 
judgement is implicit in the foiiowing words.
And i began to comprehend the selfishness of this solitary 
man. More and more 1 came to see that his blindness was a
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pose and yet his pose was an innocence. That he was a 
man from a perfect world lost in a very imperfect one. And 
determined, with a monomania as tragic, if not quite so 
ludicrous, as Don Quixote's, to maintain his perfection.
(180)
De Deukans, by trying to create a perfect world on earth, forces Conchis 
to see that in his own acceptance of socialism he too may be doing the 
same. What is dangerous is that too often good ends can justify bad 
means. In the case of de Deukans, this danger has led to a diminished 
moral sense.
Fowles suggests by the name that he gives to de Deukans' chateau that 
his world is impossible. "Givray " is an archaic French word, now mostly 
unused, meaning something like "the crystallization of ice," what we 
would call in English "frost". In naming de Deukans' residence "Givray- 
le-Duc," Fowles suggests that de Deukans’ world is in fact a crystallized 
world, a world like a frozen tableau which is outside the real world of 
change. Like all the other illusions in the novel, it is insubstantial. In its 
ultimate destruction by fire, Fowles further suggests that this kind of 
isolation from change is not only destructive of personality but impossible 
to maintain, and so must end in destruction. One may be able to keep 
one’s illusions intact for a time, but the lesson is clear: stasis is a kind of 
death.
Curiously, de Deukans must have been aware of this himself, for 
he passes on to Conchis, along with part of his fortune, five Latin words 
whose meaning is a caution against the very narcissism that has 
consumed him. Whether or not de Deukans actually exists as a real 
person is not terribly important. What is important is that he has existed 
for the purposes of Conchis’s moral lesson, which Conchis completes by 
passing along to Nicholas the five Latin words. "‘Utram bibis? Aquam an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
101
undam ? ' Which are you drinking? The water or the wave"(188)? 
Nicholas answers immediately: "He drank the wave?" Which prompts 
Conchis to offer cryptically: "We all drink both. But he meant the 
question should always be asked. It is not a precept. But a mirror" (188).
The Latin words are a riddle, but one possible interpretation-in 
light of both de Deukans' character and Nicholas’s character-is that the 
"water" and the "wave" are symbolic of "substance and style," or to use 
more familiar aesthetic terms, "content and form." Nicholas himself 
confirms this during a reflection upon Alison’s death. He tells us that he 
began to edge her death out of the moral realm and into the aesthetic, 
where it was easier to live with (401). But he realizes what he has done:
" . . .  by this characteristically twentieth-century retreat from content into 
form, from meaning into appearance, from ethics into aesthetics, from 
aqua Into unda , I dulled the pain of that accusing death" (402). We have 
thus far been shown that Nicholas is a shallow, inauthentic young man, 
living a highly stylized existence. We have been shown that de Deukans 
as well has existed in an exaggeratedly aesthetic realm. De Deukans, in 
his monomania, becomes a collector, and ultimately becomes possessed 
by what he possesses. When his perfect world, his palace of art, is 
destroyed by fire, he too is destroyed. He takes his own life because he 
has nothing left for which to live. De Deukans has allowed his life to 
degenerate into mere form, mere style. There is no meaning in his life. 
Nicholas too has become a collector. The only difference is that Nicholas 
collects women. Conchis, in passing on these words to Nicholas, is 
showing Nicholas that he must always ask himself whether he is living 
with meaning in his life (Aqua ), or is existing in mere form (Unda ). Of 
course, as Conchis reminds us, life is composed of both content and
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form, and we must not exaggerate either one. We must strike some kind 
of a balance. Conchis tries to make Nicholas aware of this self-reflective 
mirror in order that he not end like de Deukans. The message is that we 
must continually evaluate the self. It is very like the Delphic Oracle's 
"Know Thyself." We must see that this is no different from the initial stage 
of Heraclitus's teaching as well. De Deukans did not know himself. 
Despite his possession of the Latin words, he did not ask himself which it 
was he was drinking, or, if he did, his monomania was so complete that 
he no longer cared. Nicholas does learn this, as his insight in the above 
quotation shows, but the insight comes after much pain and only after the 
revealing and humiliating disintoxication scene.
The third story that Conchis relates to Nicholas is the story of 
Seidevarre. Outwardly less mysterious than the de Deukans story, its 
basic meaning is to show Nicholas the limitations of reason and to instill 
in him a new awareness of the need for mystery.
As we learned in the discussion of the previous story, Conchis 
was, in his youth, a medical doctor and a founding member of the Society 
for Reason. We remember that the manifesto of that society, while highly 
rational and humanistic, strikes at the same time a note of absolutism by 
holding that reason is supreme. Apparently, like the self, this is another of 
Conchis’s absolutes.
The occasion that prompts Conchis to relate the Seidevarre story 
is the discussion between Nicholas and Julie (who has been scripted to 
bring this discussion up) about the existence of God. Nicholas says to 
Julie that there are more important things to think about than the 
existence of God. To this, Julie replies: "1 should have thought nothing 
was more important." Nicholas replies, "Than one’s attitude to what one
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will never know? It seems to me a waste of time" (295). Juiie then draws 
Nicholas deeper into the discussion. Clearly, Conchis has scripted this 
dialogue in order to teach Nicholas another lesson. As the argument 
develops, Julie claims that God must be very intelligent since He has 
given us "no clues.. .  No certainties.. .  No reasons". Nicholas wryly 
asks, "very intelligent--or very unkind"? Julie responds, "Very wise. If I 
prayed, I'd ask God never to reveal Himself to me. Because if He did I 
should know that He was not God. But a liar" (296). These words have 
tremendous significance both in the context of Fowles's beliefs as a 
whole, and also in the context of the story about Seidevarre that Conchis 
Is about to relate for Nicholas’s benefit. Behind what Julie says about 
God is the belief that if He does exist. It is necessary that He exist for us 
as mystery. To reveal Himself to us, Julie claims, would be to destroy the 
essential aspect of His power for humankind, which is His mystery.
At this point, Conchis breaks into the conversation, telling Nicholas 
that even as a much older man, he too thought as Nicholas. He tells him 
that they are both limited In their thinking because they lack what Julie 
possesses by gender: the "intuitive humanity of womankind" (296). 
Conchis then qualifies his own ignorance by relating the Seidevarre 
story. "But then I had an experience that led me to understand what Julie 
has just said to you" (296). What Julie has said, simply, is that all thinking 
about God is really thinking about mystery, about what we will never 
know. Clearly then, in the Seidevarre story that Conchis Is about to tell, 
he wants to teach Nicholas a greater respect for mystery.
The climax of the story comes when Conchis, at the farm of Gustav 
Nygaard, witnesses Henrik Nygaard’s bizarre behavior. As Henrik 
stands immersed In water and moonlight, calling to God, Conchis tells
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Nicholas that he wished that night that he could have seen what Henrik 
had seen. "I did not know what he was seeing," says Conchis, "but I 
knew it was something of such power, such mystery, that it explained all" 
(308). Conchis then telis Nicholas the lesson he learned that night. "I 
knew the man out there on the point was having an experience beyond 
the scope of all my science and all my reason, and I knew that my 
science and reason would always be defective until they could 
comprehend what was happening in Henrik's mind" (308). Conchis's 
insight is not only insight into his own hubris in the power of reason, but 
also humankind's.
But in a flash, as of lightning, all our explanations, all our 
classifications and derivations, our aetiologies, suddenly 
appeared to me like a thin net. That great passive monster, 
reality, was no longer dead, easy to handle. It was full of 
mysterious vigor, new forms, new possibilities. The net was 
nothing, reality burst through it" (309).
Conchis realizes that Henrik has not been waiting for God, but that he
has been meeting God in his mind-Henrik has seen his pillar of fire.
Conchis’s own pillar of fire-his sudden realization-- is that his science
cannot explain Henrik’s behavior; indeed it is merely one tool among
others, useful but not absolute. Conchis’s apprehension is that the thin
net of science, the rational, cannot contain reality, for reality is both
irrational and mysterious.
The final story Conchis tells Nicholas Is the story of the Eleutheria 
man. The chapter in which it occurs in The Magus is fifty-three, the only 
chapter In the novel to possess Its own epigraph. It is given to us in the 
Greek: lAcvBepia -freedom. Athough this would lead us to expect that 
the primary lesson in this chapter is to be freedom, I will argue that
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freedom is only one half of the story. The other value we must append to 
the story is responsibility.
The Eleutheria story of World War II is related in a special way to 
Conchis’s Neuve Chapelle story of World War I. Both stories, says David 
Walker, are "provocative overstatements" (57). We remember that in the 
first story Conchis decided that in order not to betray the self, he must 
become a war-deserter. His reasoning is that nothing-no value, no 
convention, no sentiment-must override the preservation of the self. The 
self is inviolable. So likewise are we to view freedom, it too is inviolable, 
and, as well, transcendent. The Magus makes it easy to believe that 
these two values, the self and freedom, are the two themes or truths that 
the story is most in earnest to establish. From almost the opening of the 
novel, freedom becomes almost a litany. Yet if we accept this, if we 
accept that these two themes as they are presented to us are models, 
then we fail to see the meaning of the two stories which the war stories 
frame: the de Deukans story and the Seidevarre story. These two stories 
are placed strategically in between the war stories so as to be seen as 
cautionary tales of imbalance, the first of the narcissistic self and the 
second of reason, another supposedly transcendent value. These 
stories warn us, then, and should lead us to question any kind of 
absolute, including Conchis’s transcendent ones.
The narrative of the World War II story is the most dramatic of all 
the stories, partly because it describes the event which has the greatest 
significance for Conchis’s life, and partly because it discusses the 
concept of freedom, which has been almost a leitmotif throughout The
Magus-
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The climax of the story, and the lesson, Is that forced to choose 
between killing one man, or, by not doing so, forfeiting his own life and 
eighty other lives, Conchis's decision not to kill the eleutheria man with 
the butt of a rifle is an affirmation of freedom. As Conchis telis Nicholas, 
the "defence of that freedom was more important than common sense, 
self-preservation, yes, than my own life, than the lives of the eighty 
hostages" (434).
It would be helpful to remind ourselves of the kind of freedom 
Nicholas believes in. I have mentioned both these examples previously 
in the discussion of Nicholas's inauthenticity. The first example comes 
from a point early in the novel, when Nicholas leaves the girl at the 
university in East Anglia. He says, "I mistook the feeling of relief that 
dropping a girl always brought for a love of freedom" (21). The second 
example is again from early in the novel, when Nicholas describes his 
emotions after leaving Alison. "The thing I felt most clearly, when the first 
corner was turned, was that I had escaped.. .  1 began to hum, and it was 
not a brave attempt to hide my grief, but a revoltingly unclouded desire to 
celebrate my release" (48). Though Nicholas never says the word 
"freedom" in this second passage, freedom is clearly implied by the 
words "release" and "escape." What we must notice about both these 
examples is that they reveal Nicholas's conception of freedom to be 
essentially selfish. It is evident that Nicholas's conception of freedom is 
very different from Conchis’s. Nicholas's freedom is essentially a selfish 
narcissism. Conchis’s freedom is a transcendent absolute and is 
surrounded by a kind of inviolability. But what is the lesson? Is Nicholas 
meant to see Conchis's conception of freedom as normative? David 
Walker is one critic who does not believe so. In his article "Remorse,
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Responsibility, and Moral Dilemmas in Fowles’s Fiction," Walker 
questions Conchis’s notion of freedom.
When commentators concentrate on Conchis’s actual 
choice in this episode, they miss an essential point-that 
freedom, eleutheria, is not a human, or at least not a 
humane, attribute. Freedom is a biological fact, 
fundamentally alien to civilized existence, and those like 
Wimmel or the kapetan , who follow freedom through to its 
biological extremes, produce a horrifying degradation of 
humanity.(58)
In light of what Walker says here, we must not see Conchis’s kind of 
freedom as sacrosanct. In its absolutism, it is as suspect as all other 
absolutes.
If Conchis’s conception of freedom is suspect, a particular light is 
shed upon Nicholas’s own decision in the disintoxication scene. Fowles 
links Conchis’s ordeal in the square both structurally and thematically 
with Nicholas’s ordeal of disintoxication. White he seems to invite us to 
see parallels between them, there are in fact many differences. Walker 
explains.
Unlike Julie, whom Nicholas perceives as having cruelly 
treated him, the kapetan had given no offense to Conchis 
personally and had already suffered atrociously for his 
deeds. In contrast to Conchis’s experience, Nicholas’s 
decision to inflict the ’’sentence" will not provoke the 
massacre of eighty innocent bystanders. (61 )
So, if the circumstances are really different, why does Fowles make the
connection so inviting? One reason for doing so might be to give
Nicholas’s decision the same degree of heightened drama. In Conchis’s
decision, we have a sense that the moment of choice carries with it
profound significance. It surely qualifies as one of those moments on the
point of fulcrum. In like manner we are to see Nicholas’s decision as
equally profound. But I want to suggest here another reason. In making
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the episodes seem to parallel each other, Fowles really does wants to 
conjoin them in our minds, but he does so in order to contrast the 
differences between their decisions, if Conchis’s decision is no longer 
viewed as being normative, then we must open our thinking to the 
possibility that Nicholas reaches this same realization.
it is in the disintoxication scene that we can see Nicholas’s growth. 
Conchis has given Nicholas the opportunity to avenge all his frustrations 
and all his humiliations as a result of the Godgame upon Julie. He 
provides Nicholas with a cat-o’-nine-tails with which to whip Julie. 
Nicholas has absolute freedom. But he refuses to whip Julie. When we 
ask what is it that prevents him from doing so, the answer must be that 
Nicholas has learned and assimilated Conchis’s paradox: "the better 
you understand freedom, the less you possess" (518). He has learned to 
balance absolute freedom, Conchis’s freedom in the square, Wimmel's 
demonic freedom, the freedom that lets an organization "crash through 
law, through my job, through respect for the dead, through everything 
that made the world customary and habitable and oriented" (495), with 
responsibility. We have once again the outward movement of the 
protagonist, this ethical movement out of the self that recognizes the 
claims of the community.
Nicholas’s return to London is the completion of the Phraxos 
section both physically-since Nicholas has quit Greece and returned to 
London-and also in the psychological sense. I want now to discuss his 
psychological completion.
When critics discuss the Phraxos section of the novel, it is most 
often characterized as a journey, or quest, or crucible in which Nicholas 
achieves some measure of insight (see Palmer, Barnum, Loveday). The
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question upon which there is considerably less consensus is whether or 
not the novel ends with the reunion of Nicholas and Alison. I have said 
earlier that one way we measure Nicholas's growth is determined by his 
desire to reconnect with Alison. Yet Nicholas could still conceivably 
desire a reunion and yet not have learned from his experience. I want to 
discuss one last episode which I believe confirms that Nicholas has 
learned to balance freedom and responsibility, as argued in my 
discussion of the Eleutheria story, and shows also that it is this very 
knowledge, the need to balance a selfish freedom with one's 
responsibility to others, that enables Nicholas to come to terms with his 
destiny and to realize that it lies with Alison.
It has been my argument that Fowles’s characters achieve 
enlightenment in a particular way. They first become more existentially 
authentic, and then they act outwardly beyond themselves, a movement 
that I have called a moral impulse. By looking at the butcher story we 
shall see that Nicholas understands the dilemma of self and other, 
freedom and responsibility, for the butcher story itself suggests that the 
balancing of the two is a profound but necessary challenge.
The butcher story is first mentioned by Nicholas during his final 
meeting with Lily de Seitas. The story is no doubt cryptic, but I want to 
suggest one possible meaning.
As related by Nicholas, it is a story about a butcher and Marie 
Antoinette. The butcher, brandishing a cleaver, leads a mob into the 
palace at Versailles. Shouting that he will cut Marie Antoinette’s throat, 
the butcher forces the door of the Royal apartments. When, finally, he 
comes face to face with the Queen, he falls to his knees and begins to
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weep (630). Insight into the meaning of the story is found in the answer 
to the question, Why does the butcher weep?
While the story is somewhat of an enigma, we divine its meaning 
best by looking at how it relates to Lily and Nicholas. The story is only an 
enigma until we have viewed Conchis's four life-stories in the way that I 
have suggested. We see that the self, while important, is not to be taken 
as an end in itself. The de Deukans story was a caution against just this. 
The Seidevarre story shows the limitations of reason . It too is a caution 
against absolutes.
I suggest that the story of the butcher signifies the impulse of 
freedom and the impulse of moral responsibility. Free to cut the Queen's 
throat, the butcher is intoxicated with this thought until the very moment 
when, confronting the Queen, he must do it. But he cannot bring himself 
to do so. There is something further in him, some super-commandment 
that will not allow him to do so, at least not easily. The butcher collapses 
and weeps in the realization that understanding and managing one's 
freedom and one's responsibility is no simple business. His actions are 
different from those of a Wimmel because he is not crying out of fear or 
impotence, but out of knowledge. Living in reality, in hazard, means that 
we must confront and balance freedom and responsibility every day.
Why does Lily de Seitas remind Nicholas of this story? She does 
so because Nicholas before Lily is like the butcher before Marie.
Nicholas, if he were to exercise absolute freedom, might desire to strike 
Lily, to exact some revenge, strike through her expert coolness. But as 
he showed in the disintoxication scene, he has beginning to learn the 
self, and this Insight is conjoined with the knowledge that he has a 
responsibility to others. Nicholas is aware of a moral imperative that
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forces him to balance the two. This is what he means when he says in 
the disintoxication scene "I could see it in Conchis’s eyes; something 
besides eleutheria had been proved" (519).
Fowles again draws parallel scenes, this time between the butcher 
story and Nicholas's understanding of and decision to reconnect with 
Alison. The connection between these two is reinforced by Nicholas's 
packing episode. After having hurt Jo-Jo and quarrelled with Kemp, 
Nicholas goes upstairs and begins to pack hurriedly. In the process, he 
breaks the plate that had been given to him by Lily. Kneeling, holding 
the broken pieces, Nicholas begins to cry (645). Like the butcher, 
Nicholas understands the awesome challenge that balancing freedom 
and responsibility places upon us. The plate symbolizes Nicholas's 
future, a future that he now understands he wants, but that, as he now 
realizes, requires constant vigilance. This is Nicholas's point of fulcrum. 
"Conchis had talked of points of fulcrum, moments when one met one’s 
future. I also knew it was bound up with Alison, with choosing Alison, 
and having to go on choosing her every day" (641).
Nicholas shows that he understands that true wisdom Is the need 
to balance the self and the other, freedom and responsibility.
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Chapter Four: "The Ebony Tower"
It is hard to fight against passion; for whatever 
it wants it buys at the expense of soul.
Man's character is his fate.
Heraclitus, CV, CXIV
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At first glance, "The Ebony Tower" would appear to have difficulty 
conforming to the paradigm that 1 have been advancing, except by 
negation. The most obvious difficulty concerns the ending. By the story’s 
end, the sense of failure surrounding David Williams is so complete that it 
is difficult for the reader to see him by any other light. This is further 
aggravated by the fact that David himself attests to his failure.
The central fact that David fails in his "test" is the most 
conventional reading, and to my knowledge, it has not been seriously 
contested. Carol Barnum's remarks in The Fiction of John Fowles are 
fairly representative of this consensus. "As a source of information, his 
journey will not be wasted; as a source of psychic growth, not the 
expressed purpose but the implied opportunity, his journey will be 
wasted because his rational response will prove insufficient to the 
challenge" (78). We might recall from my chapter on The Collector that 
Barnum saw that novel as well from a similar perspective. There, as 
here, her thesis requires that the protagonists be seen to apply 
knowledge gained on the quest in their lives. Failing this, the novels are 
seen to comprise, in the case of The Magus, an anti-myth, and in "The 
Ebony Tower," a failed quest. But must the novels and stories end 
positively in order for us to claim that the protagonists in them are 
successful in learning something about themselves and then are able to 
apply that knowledge beyond themselves? This after all is the present 
thesis. Are we able to see in David Williams a protagonist who achieves 
some measure of Insight into his self, an existential awareness, and then 
from that newly- awakened awareness shows an understanding of the 
need to balance the self with others, in other words, demonstrates a 
moral impulse?
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While the conventional reading of the novel does carry a certain 
force, there are at least four points upon which we might base an 
alternative reading.
The first of these has to do with the perspective of the narrator. 
"The Ebony Tower" is narrated from a third person omniscient point of 
view. Given the fact that in many other Fowles fictions (including the 
other fictions that appear in the collection with "The Ebony Tower") the 
narratorial voice is often ambiguous, indeed at times ironic, might we not 
question it in this story as well? Simon Loveday raises a similar question 
in his discussion of The Maaus (38, 39), and there has been some 
question over how far we can trust the diaries in The Collector, as well as 
other questions on narratorial veracity (see for example Binns, Eddins, 
Loveday).
In "A Personal Note," from the same collection as "The Ebony 
Tower," Fowles reveals that "The Ebony Tower" is thematically and 
emotionally related to the story "Eliduc." In this story, the protagonist, 
Eliduc, gets himself into the position where he is confronted by a 
dilemma which, in the terms presented by the story, is primarily a moral 
dilemma. He must choose between two women. However, as 
MoSweeney points out, Eliduc is relieved of having to make a decision 
by a "deus ex machina " (119) in the plot. Eliduc is not made to suffer for 
his moral transgression because his first wife, in a gesture of profound 
Christian charity, agrees to step aside. As a result, Eliduc does not really 
have to face the responsibility for his actions. There is no such deus ex 
machina in Fowles's story. All the action in the story brings David to the 
point where he must make a moral decision. If this is the primary thrust of 
the story, as I maintain it is, then might not David's actions warrant a
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conclusion different from the ones offered by those who see the story 
from the more conventional perspective?
Third, it is my contention that the story supports a reading in which 
David Williams's final choice can be seen as a choice that balances 
freedom with responsibility. David "fails" only in the sense that he fails to 
understand that Breasley’s conception of the artist is flawed. Just as 
Conchis’s conception of freedom is too absolute, too exclusive, so too is 
Breasley's conception of the artist too narrow, for it excludes the moral. 
By identifying one kind of art and artist with existential authenticity, 
Breasley prevents the possibility of other viewpoints, and perverts the 
creative relationship between the artistic and the existential that Fowles 
promotes.* I suggest that David has "learned" Breasley too well. Kerry 
McSweeney, in a different context, makes an intriguing observation 
seldom noted by other critics, but which tends to support my point. He 
says that " . . .  the thematic thrust of "The Ebony Towef" hinges on the 
dubious premise ‘that a non-conformist personal life is a precondition for 
great art'" (120). This is precisely the "lesson" David has learned. He 
subscribes wholly to Breasley's "dubious premise," and as a 
consequence, dreadfully misconstrues the significance of his "failure" 
with Diana.
Finally, might we not see in Breasley's "dubious premise" and its 
corollary, that "nothing stand between self and expression" (108), a 
similar kind of absolute to Conchis's absolute freedom in the eleutheria
* For a lucid discussion on this aspect of the fictions, sec 
Frederick M. Holmes in “Art, Truth, and John Fowles’s The  
M agus.” also his “The Novelist as Magus: John Fowles and the
Function of Narrative;” and Dwight Eddins in “John Fowles; 
Existence as Authorship."
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episode? Both doctrines imply not only an absolutism, but a selfish 
absolutism. They are exaggerations, imbalances, and as such they need 
to be balanced in the manner of Heraclitus's paradigm. Balance is 
effected by an awareness of responsibility that goes beyond the self.
Based on these four considerations, I want to offer a different 
reading of "The Ebony Tower." In my reading, we shall see the story as 
conforming more closely to my general argument. David Williams does 
gain insight into his self, and further, he can be seen to balance his 
selfish and individual desires with a consideration for others.
I shall first look at the ways in which David is inauthentic. David is 
a familiar Fowlesian protagonist. Like Nicholas Urfe before him, he has 
accumulated ideas and opinions about life that actually prevent him from 
living authentically. His blindness about himself, about mystery, and 
about the contingent in life is revealed to us in his thinking and in his 
treatment of the other characters in the story.
David’s self-absorption is evident as the story opens. We meet 
him as he sets upon a journey (one upon which he anticipates pleasure 
but, as in other Fowles works, one upon which he will painfully learn) to 
interview an older and famous artist. David’s thoughts as he drives 
towards his meeting with Henry Breasley are reminiscent of Nicholas’s 
feelings of "release" and "escape" as he prepared to go to Greece.
He felt a little guilty to be enjoying himself so much, to be 
here so unexpectedly alone, without Beth, and after he had 
made such a fuss: but the day, the sense of discovery and 
of course the object of the whole exercise looming 
formidably and yet agreeably just ahead, everything 
conspired to give a pleasant illusion of bachelor freedom.
(9)
What Is immediately evident from this passage is David's sense that he is
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initiating an adventure alone. He is "without Beth" and under an "illusion 
ot bachelor freedom." A knowledge of Fowles's previous fiction alerts us 
to the fact that David appears to be another one of Fowles's inconstant 
men who confuse true freedom with an individual and selfish notion of 
escape from responsibility. We also see in David's anticipation, in his 
"sense of discovery" that looms "agreeably" ahead, an attitude that shows 
a false understanding of mystery. David's sense of mystery is not the 
sense of mystery that Fowles says we must preserve. David’s mystery is 
a perverted and egotistical attitude that views mystery very much as a 
private pleasure. Like Nicholas, David does not appreciate that part of 
mystery is hazard, and that a proper understanding of mystery requires 
an appreciation of the necessity of hazard in life. David has no such 
appreciation; in fact his overly rational approach to life will not allow it. 
David therefore has no understanding, as yet, that mystery may not be all 
that agreeable. Both of these attitudes allow David to exist in a contented 
complacency.
We are given further evidence of the foundation of David’s 
complacency In the narration of his past. We are told that he is rara avis : 
he has a natural talent for colour and line-the gifts of a natural artist- 
and, unlike the majority, he is highly articulate. These talents enable 
David to be both a painter and a critic. As a result of the happy marriage 
of these two talents, David finds himself headed toward Coëtminais, 
commissioned to write the introduction to a book about Henry Breasley. 
All this leads him to remark of his upcoming assignment that it was "one 
more sign that things in general were shaping up well" (16). David, we 
conclude, is a smugly contented young man. He begins to look more 
and more like one of Fowles's precious Few, one of the "dominant
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hundred thousand." But the dividing line, as Fowles claims it does, runs 
through David. David is possessed of many illusions and false attitudes 
that he must transcend If he is to become more like the Few than the 
Many.
One of the more obvious signs of David's smug egocentrism is his 
quick reckoning of the character and worth of other people. We 
remember that both Miranda and Nicholas initially judge others, only to 
have their initial judgements continually usurped and proved wrong by 
those they judge. We looked at this aspect in the previous fictions, 
especially The Maaus. and saw there that Fowles develops this attitude 
in his protagonists around the theme of illusion versus reality, or the ideal 
versus the real. Just as Nicholas begins with many illusions, and must 
be led from those illusions into a greater appreciation of reality, so it is 
with David. David judges Diana (the Mouse), Anne (the Freak), and 
Henry Breasley, and we can chart his existential growth, his 
understanding of the self, by the degree to which he is able to get beyond 
his Initial judgements and ideas and reevaluate and reassess first 
principles.
David's initial judgement of Anne is the harshest and shows David 
at his shallowest. From the time he first meets her until well into the story, 
she is seen through David’s eyes as indeed "freakish". Described 
variously by terms such as "preposterous" (25), "neurotic golliwog" (25), 
"absurd sex-doll" (36), "monkeyish" and "artificial" (39), she seems almost 
beneath David's notice. Aroused by Diana’s more refined and sibylline 
aspects, David will go out of his way to "learn" her. Anne, however, is 
afforded no such charity. Well into the story, even as late as the picnic 
scene, we have revealed to us David's shallow and judgmental nature:
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"What he had to learn about her, beyond a little ability to debunk, a 
trendily shallow narcissism, a iife-stye that patently hid a iife-failure, he 
could not imagine"(62). Besides the tone, which immediately reveals a 
smug superiority, we recognize the too-hasty reckoning of another’s 
character. David has not known Anne long enough, nor has he had the 
opportunity to get to know her, and yet he does not hesitate to form an ill- 
opinion of her.
When it comes to the Mouse, David's initial judgement is equally 
skewed. From the moment he first meets her-when she admits him into 
the Manoir--Dav\d attempts to assay her character from his initial 
impressions. He describes her variously as "bizzarely modest and 
handmaidenly"(13), "like a patronne " (14), "preternaturally grave.. .  
almost Victorian" (14), "muselike" (14), "cool and sibylline" (14), and self- 
possessed (34). Captivated by his own narcissistic and ideal conception 
of her, David desires to "learn" her. While more infatuated by Diana than 
by Anne, and therefore less cruel in his judgements, David is no more 
correct in his initial assumptions about her character.
David's shallow complacency, both in his life and his ideas, is 
nowhere more evident than in his relationship with Breasley. We 
remember that before he has even met Breasley, David's smug 
assuredness Is revealed in his thoughts that the trip to Coëtminais is not 
really necessary. "He had already drafted the introduction, he knew 
pretty well what he was going to say" (16). David assumes that he 
understands Breasley's work and that nothing much else is needed, 
except perhaps a few biographical facts. We might point out here that 
David's view is formed from a purely intellectual, art-critic perspective. 
David views Breasley's development as an artist in a rational and causal
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way, as one period or style developing from another which then leads to 
another. As the story develops, it is this kind of rational certainty that 
David will find undermined again and again.
Another situation where David jumps to conclusion is upon his 
arrival at the Manoir. He sees the girls sun-bathing in the nude and 
assumes that this is proof of Breasley's infamous life-style: "the wicked 
old faun and his famous afternoons" (12). It is only later that David is told, 
by Breasley himself, that through their youth the girls provide him with 
mostly an emotional kind of vitality, which Breasley refers to as "Roman 
Charity" (30). But the most serious-and ironic-misunderstanding of 
David's is his under-estimation of Henry as an intellectual force.
David begins his journey thinking he is going to interview an old 
artist, perhaps clear up a few biographical details, but in the main, to 
meet him for the fun of it (16). Ever true to his superficial and hasty 
assumptions, David, after his first afternoon with Breasley, writes him off 
as an old sham.
David began to suspect he was dealing with a paper tiger; 
or certainly one still living in a world before he himself was 
born. The occasional hint of aggression was based on 
such ludicrously old-fashioned notions of what shocked 
people, what red rags could infuriate them; to reverse the 
simile, it was rather like playing matador to a blind bull.
Only the pompous fool could let himself be caught on such 
obvious horns.(32)
David, however, will prove himself to be just such a fool, as the dinner
ordeal that same evening will bear out. The cumulative effect of David's
mis-judgements in ail these cases prepares us for his eventual fall.
As with other Fowlesian protagonists, David is in desperate need 
of enlightenment as to the true nature of his own self. And like other 
Fowlesian characters who likewise exist in a  kind of Heraclitean slumber.
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he does not realize that In his complacency, he is living half a life. This is 
the main reason why the existential moment is so significant and 
transforming for all the inauthentic men in Fowles's fiction; after having 
lived half-lives, they find that the reality of living full-lives is extraordinarily 
liberating. In David’s case, the obvious horns are his own false illusions 
that make him inauthentic, and his goring during the dinner ordeal 
awakens him from his existential slumbers.
In the larger novels, the enlightenment of the protagonists is given 
considerable time in which to develop, usually several hundred pages.
As McSweeney implies, Fowles has no such luxury in "The Ebony 
Tower." Here, "he needs every bit of the timeless ambiance of romance 
he can generate in order to depict convincingly in the space of a few 
fictional hours and in only a hundred pages the same complex process of 
sexual attraction, awareness of deprivation, apprehension of mystery, 
suspicion of deception, and arrival of the crunch.. .  " (120). In "The 
Ebony Tower," Fowles accomplishes jmuch of this in the two episodes in 
which David has extended conversations with Breasley. The first of 
these conversations is over dinner on the first evening of David’s arrival. 
The second is when Breasley shows David his work. It is only after these 
encounters with Breasley that David begins to be less sure of his 
judgements, his ideas and his life. Only after this will David be 
sufficiently sensitized to his own nature, his own self and be able to go 
beyond appearances and his own preconceived ideas. He will have 
been sensitized into a new awareness of reality. In a sense, the 
encounters with Breasley function almost like a disintoxication, purging 
David of his illusions.
Before we discuss the dinner scenes and the manner of their
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significance to Nicholas’s growing existential understanding, we must be 
aware of another function that these scenes have in the story. It is 
primarily in the dinner scene and the scene between Breasley and David 
that follows the next day that Fowles develops the aesthetic theme, or 
more accurately, grafts the aesthetic theme to the existential theme. It is 
the joining of these themes, and David's resultant confusion between 
them that lead him to confuse his artistic self with his existential self.
If the story is seen primarily from the artistic perspective, then 
David's own estimation of his failure with Diana becomes valid, and 
symbolic of his existential failure. This is in fact the conventional reading 
of the story. We accept David's judgement of himself in his own terms 
and we are swept along with him into seeing his failure with Diana as a 
complete existential failure. But, as in many of Fowles's other novels, is 
there in this story as well a dominant narratorial irony? Ought we to trust 
the narrator completely? Must we as readers be oblivious of what David 
himself has been oblivious? In seeing his failure with Diana as 
something more than "bungling the adventure of the body" (109), and in 
his confusion of his artistic self with his existential self, David has 
transformed what is merely a physical failure (Diana) and an artistic 
failure (his desire for "lastingness") into a metaphysical failure of his 
existential self. I want to argue that while it may be true that David fails as 
an artist, it does not follow that he fails "existentially" as well. Rather, 
David is confronted with painful choice and in his actions shows himself 
to be existentially true.
There are several reasons that account for David's confusion: his 
youth relative to Breasley, his confusion of the real world with 
Coëtminais's faintly mythic one, and his wanting and needing adventure.
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All these factors lead David to overvalue the meaning of his relationship 
with Diana. But this confusion of David's need be only his, not the 
readers' as well.
The real question that the story presents is a moral one. It is 
similar to Eliduc's. Which loyalty, when both claim allegiance, does one 
honor? In the terms of Fowles's story, does one choose absolute 
personal freedom (Diana) or does one choose a relative freedom (Beth), 
a freedom in responsibility?
We must see here, as we did in The Magus, that for Fowles, the 
morality in a situation lies not so much in which choice is made, as in the 
nature of choice and the way it is made. Fowles's kind of morality is very 
rarely prescriptive. Concerning David's choice in this story, Carol 
Barnum has quoted Fowles from The Aristos to show that David's 
decision is not a moral one ("Quest Motif" 146). She means by this that 
Fowles does not necessarily consider whether or not David and Diana 
have sex to be a moral issue. She is probably correct. But, while Fowles 
might not be concerned with the moral issue of sex , he is concerned with 
the moral issue of balancing selfish freedom with responsibility,
David does learn lessons which he is in need of learning. He has 
glimpsed a view of the "green freedom" that his overly-rational approach 
to life has denied him. He sees that he has been too cerebral, that art is 
not only about theories in the head but is connected to the physical 
world, to the body. There is in David a newly-discovered awareness that 
Diana is symbolic of freedom; that she represents a freedom that he has 
not reckoned before his experience at Coëtminais. But we must not 
confuse the fact that because Breasley teaches some lessons David 
needs to learn, that everything Breasley teaches David must learn.
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David demonstrates an understanding in his trial scene similar to the 
understanding Nicholas demonstrated in his trial scene. Nicholas 
refuses to use the "cat" because he understands that Conchis's freedom 
is not a desirable freedom because absolute and selfish. David refuses 
to consummate the passion between him and Diana as a result of the 
same understanding. We recall that Nicholas does not realize this 
insight at the time. I suggest that David not only does not realize this 
insight at the time, but does not even realize this insight by the end of the 
story. Just as Nicholas requires many months in which to absorb fully 
his experience of Bourani, so too will David require time before he can 
fully absorb the meaning of his experience. Therefore, we must see 
David's reflective self-castigation at the end of the story as a post- 
operational state in which he is not fully lucid.
That David himself fails to recognize the importance of his ordeal 
at the time is revealed to us in his analysis of events at the story's end.
He says that the first evening was "that preposterously obvious reef"
(108), and that the real rock of truth was the knowledge he learned about 
himself that comes as a result of his existential choice concerning Diana. 
While it is true that all choice Is to some degree existentially significant, 
we need not view David's choice in David's terms. David sees his choice 
in this way: either he chooses to sin, to break his loyalty to Beth and 
consummate his passion for Diana, thereby fulfilling his corrupted notion 
of the artistic soul, or he honors his commitment to Beth, refuses Diana, 
and remains what he is and has always been; "a decent man and 
eternal also-ran" (112). It is this very fact, David's confusion of his desire 
for Diana and his buried desire to be a "lasting" artist, that results in his 
overwhelming despair at the story's end. Without the knowledge gained
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by the first reef, without the disruption of his smug complacency, he 
would not have sailed on to reach any rock of truth. It is only when he 
begins to understand Breasley's work and question his own, that his real 
existential choice-between Diana and Beth--is given meaning. And this 
is the point: we must view this story primarily as a crisis of David's artistic 
soul, not his existential or moral one. David fails only in the first instance, 
not in the second.
David learns through the art debate with Henry that he is 
disconnected from a vitality that is necessary to him not only as an artist 
but as a man. It is this debate that shocks David out of his old 
complacency. Breasley’s attack then is more than just bile. While it is a 
condemnation both of David’s life and art, it suggests at the same time an 
art and way of life that is more inclusive and more accommodating of the 
mysterious. This provides David with the knowledge that is necessary for 
his growth.
When we first meet David he is driving through the French 
countryside on his way to meet Breasley at Coëtminais. Fowles gives us 
David's character not so much through direct description as through the 
oblique method of identifying David as an abstract painter. As David 
travels through the countryside, he makes notes on what he sees:
Twice he stopped and noted down particularly pleasing 
conjunctions of tone and depth-parallel stripes of 
watercolor with penciled notes of amplification in his neat 
hand. Though there was some indication of the formal 
origin in these verbal notes-that a stripe of color was 
associated with a field, a sunlit wall, a distant hill-he drew 
nothing. (9)
David's character is defined partly through his artistic stance. The 
"stripes of color" and "conjunctions of tone and depth" along with the fact
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that "he drew nothing" are hints that David is an abstractionist.
As the story develops, Fowles sets David Williams’s aesthetic 
creed against Henry Breasley's. Breasley, we learn, paints in a more 
representational style. We might immediately think that Fowles is 
contrasting the cold and aloof style of abstractionism with the warm­
blooded humanism of representational art. This is, however, only partly 
true. Breasley's aesthetic has gone through several styles and it was 
only fairly late in his career that he discovered his own style. "There was 
a feeling. . . o f  a fully absorbed eclecticism, something that had been 
evidenced all through his career, but not really come to terms with before 
Coëtminais (18). As an artist, he has lived through many periods and 
styles, and his "genius" has been to take from them, on both emotional 
and technical levels, what he has needed to express his own vision. 
Breasley has achieved what Fowles has claimed the true artist should: 
he must not "turn artistic creation into a morass of pastiche; if the artist 
has any genuine originality it will pierce through all its disguises" (The 
Aristos 203). Breasley has a connection to the past, but it does not 
dominate the individual in him. Thus Fowles supplies the reader with the 
artistic differences between Breasley and Williams. It is in this difference 
that David is able to learn something about himself.
Breasley’s attack on David’s art has two aspects. By identifying 
what abstract art lacks, it points to what is needed in art. Breasley begins 
by equating David’s art with mathematics: "Footsteps of Pythagoras, that 
right"(41 )? David looks to the Mouse for the meaning in this and she tells 
David that Henry is asking if he paints abstracts. "Obstructs," Breasley 
quickly interjects. In these two brief comments are contained the kernel 
of Breasley's dissatisfaction with abstractionist art. The Pythagoras
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allusion hints at where Henry feels abstract art finds its soul: in the head, 
not the heart. Geometry, line, color-the idea-become more important 
than the human fact. Abstract ideas "obstruct" art from conveying 
anything humanly meaningful. "Ideas. Can’t care"(50). Without 
connection to the real, without nature, art ceases to be a means of 
communication. As it becomes less visceral and more cerebral, it 
becomes merely a game played by artists and critics. This is what 
happened in the case of Guernica. The audience was lost as to its 
meaning, and it became merely a cerebral exercise between painter and 
critic, an empty expression of sympathy. As David reveals in his 
anagnorisis: "Turning away from nature and reality had atrociously 
distorted the relationship between painter and audience" (110).
The other thing that is "obstructed" is the human form itself. 
Breasley's emphasis on the importance of all aspects of the human body 
is underscored in his championing of how art is made. "Not oil. Pigment. 
All shit. If it’s any good. M erde . Human excrement. Excrementum .
That which grows out"(47). This fair-needs-foul philosophy, essential to 
good art, is partly responsible for the equation David will make later: to 
sleep with Diana is to make better art. The corollary is that not to sleep 
with her is to make weak art. This is the conclusion that seems warranted 
by the logic of the conventional reading. But is David’s further 
abstraction, that he fails in his existential moment, true as well? To 
answer this question we need to examine David’s actions and his 
reflection on his actions in the episode with Diana in the garden.
David claims that his crime lay in his "fatal indecision"(107). But is 
this true? Does David, as he believes, decide by not deciding? And 
what exactly is the nature of his crime? Evidence within the story denies
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that David is indecisive. In truth, David does choose.
There are several moments in his meeting with Diana where 
David specifically chooses: he makes the choice for non-involvement. 
The first comes when they are still in Diana's room, talking. David 
remains, after Diana has tied up her portfolio, and he becomes aware of 
the "truth" between them. "A pretense, the undeclared knowledge of a 
shared imagination, hung in the air"(95). David's response is to reject 
the opportunity. He murmurs, "It's time I went" (96). At this point Diana 
suggests a walk in the garden. Again David senses another opportunity, 
and again he dismisses it. He questions whether he has Imagined the 
sexual tension between them back in the room. "But he had not 
imagined. It was here, now, the unsaid. He knew it in every nerve and 
premonitory fiber. His move: he drew back into speech"(97). Shortly 
after this, David feels the impulse to reach out and take her hand, but he 
defeats this impulse by suggesting that she will meet another. "The last 
effort to distance. ‘He will turn up. The knight errant'"(97). It is clear up to 
this point that David has chosen to disallow any involvement.
Interestingly, Beth enters his thinking, and David tries to fool himself that 
his thoughts about Beth at this moment are not morally motivated, by 
recalling to mind a pact he and Beth made. "[I]f they were against 
anything, it was having a general opinion on such matters, judging them 
morally"(98). But why then has he hesitated?
It is at this point that David is affected by Henry's example and by 
his own artistic desire. To confound his hesitation, he trumps his feelings 
with the following thoughts:
So why make an exception of this? Why deny experience,
his artistic soul’s sake, why ignore the burden of the old
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man's entire life? And so little: a warmth, a clinging, a brief 
entry into another body. One small releasing act. (98)
This is the one sure spur that will motivate David: his desire to be
artistically authentic. Although this thought stirs him to kiss Diana, he
retracts immediately what the kiss might imply. He says, "I'm sorry,"
meaning not just the kiss, but "everything"(99). This shows that David
has in fact chosen. He is apologizing to her out of a kind of honor for the
fact that he cannot allow himself to consummate their passion. That not
even David is aware of what stops him at this juncture is made plain in
his reflection a paragraph later. "He searched for words, but found none;
or none that explained him"{99).
From this point on it is Diana that is resolved to respect David's 
resolve. We remember that the story has suggested that David and 
Diana are similar. Diana, like David, is essentially conventional. Diana 
believes, or wants to believe, in the fairy tale. There is an important 
exchange between them on this point.
She said, "It's my fault. I . . .  "
"You?”
"Fairy tales. About sleeping princesses."
"They could live together. Afterward." (98)
Here, David utters the words that are in Diana’s mind. To live 
"afterwards" with the Princess is to live happily ever after. When the full 
realization of this impossibility takes hold, Diana is as opposed to any 
involvement as was David before her. As they walk back from the 
orchard, they pass by Breasley’s studio where David takes notice of 
Breasley's unfinished canvas. Kermesse. In the few steps it takes them 
to get to the door, David wants desperately now to consummate the 
passion that exists between them. I suggest that it is the artist in him.
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recalled by Breasley's canvas, that is a spur to David here. It is the 
tyranny of his artistic self, schooled in the Breasley academy where true 
artists are not afraid of the body, that motivates David. When, later, David 
tries to force the consummation, it Is evidence of the tyranny of his 
monomania for artistic authenticity. But it is a feeble wish brought about 
by David's ever-increasing sense of failure in that realm. The further 
Diana retreats, the more desperate is David to regain the chance for his 
artistic soul's sake. The more that this becomes an impossibility, the 
more David imbues the missed opportunity with significance-a 
significance that is concerned primarily with his artistic stature. This 
confusion of his existential authenticity with his artistic authenticity is 
made plain in the following passage.
But he had never really had, or even attempted to give 
himself, the far greater existential chance. He had had 
doubts about his work before; but not about his fundamental 
nature, or at anv rate that there was not in it the potential 
wherewithal to lav the ghost that profoundlv haunts everv 
artist: his lastinaness. (109, the emphasis is mine)
In other words, David feels that his inability to sin prevents him from
becoming a better artist. He says of Breasley: "Henry knew sin was a
challenge to life; not an unreason, but an act of courage and
imagination. He sinned out of need and instinct" (107).
The final proof that David confuses his failure as an artist with his 
complete existential failure is evident in David's following reflection.
"[H]e had refused (and even if he had never seen her again) a chance of 
a new existence, and the ultimate quality and enduringness of his work 
had rested on acceptance"(112). At the end, David is concerned with his 
"lastingness" as an artist. He has learned one of Breasley's lessons-
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nothing must come between the self and expression-and has made his 
failure with Diana into a failure of his fundamental nature. In these terms, 
his failure is the failure to deny himself nothing. He fails to be as selfish 
as Breasley. David accepts this judgement as his final truth. Since he 
cannot exercise Breasley's kind of selfish freedom, he condemns himself 
as an "eternal also-ran." But where Breasley's triumph is as an artist, 
David's triumph is as a decent man. That David never sees this as a 
triumph indicates the degree to which he has interpreted his failure from 
the corrupted artistic perspective.
Freedom, as Fowles has tried to show in all his fiction, is never 
absolute. Breasley's kind of selfishness may in fact be the high price of 
great art. But there is something perverted about his ideal. David, early 
in the story, has unknowingly intuited the truth about Breasley: he had 
achieved the "freedom to be exactly as he always had been, a halo 
around his selfishness" (56). Contrastingly, David's choice shows that 
true freedom, responsible freedom, is only possible between two people 
and can never be realized by one person alone. There is a balance 
implied in freedom: between the needs of the self and the needs of 
others. The achievement of this knowledge is sometimes arrived at only 
through painful choice. Ultimately, this is the drama in this fiction, as in 
all of Fowles's fictions. The conflict is between modern day loyalties, 
between a selfish and absolute freedom and a responsible and relative 
one.
The story is written in such a way, that is, with the artistic theme 
constantly before us, that it is difficult to see David Williams's cholce-his 
fidelity to his wife-as anything but complete failure. But Fowles says that 
we must always make choices for ever greater freedom both for the self
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and for others. What I have been trying to show is that it is never 
absolute , unmitigated freedom; it is always a freedom with responsibility. 
David never fully credits himself for what he does achieve; he has 
balanced desire for absolute personal freedom with his commitment to 
those outside the self: namely Beth. David exercises freedom with 
responsibility by honoring his commitment to her. He chooses to temper 
personal freedom with responsibility to the other. What makes David 
choose this way is the ethical impulse behind all Fowles's work: the 
impulse to be just.
Consequently, David is another of Fowles's slightly tarnished 
heroes. As with Miranda and Nicholas before him, his journey becomes 
a crucible in which he gains an expanded knowledge of the self. If David 
as hero has any boon to share with the community, it is his knowledge 
that the better he understands the self, the more he sees he is part of the 
community.
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In the course of this study I have argued that all of Fowles’s 
protagonists can be seen to undergo a journey. But, the journey is very 
specific. It is an inward journey first, a journey toward self, and then an 
outward journey, a journey toward others. The two doctrines that 
promote these kinds of movements are existential and moral.
This journey, as existential humanists throughout the ages have 
attested, begins with the self. The "journey" is, of course, a metaphor. 
While many of Fowles's fictions do describe physical journeys-Ibs  
Maaus. "The Ebony Tower," A M aaaot-as many have no physical 
journev-The Collector. The French_Lieutenant's Woman, and Mantissa: 
or, rather, the journeys of these last works are journeys of the mind. In 
this sense, all the fictions are journeys of the mind, because they all 
require their protagonists to travel inward.
Fowles has made use of a metaphor from an ancient Greek 
philosopher, Heraclitus, to suggest that the reality of human nature is that 
very few people understand the need to initiate this journey, and fewer 
still undertake it. Sadly, for humankind, most people do not want to be 
roused from their unthinking complacency. This situation has been true 
since humankind has existed.
An unfortunate consequence of this biological division, says 
Fowles, is that the distinction between a Few who struggle to understand 
themselves and their society, to evolve, and a Many who avoid this 
struggle, is a notion that has been abused by reactionaries of all stripes.
It has been abused because the abusers assume that the line that 
distinguishes these two groups runs between individuals, when in fact, 
as Fowles says, the line runs through each individual. We are all at times 
like the Few, at other times like the Many.
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This is the truth behind the philosophy of the first thinker to 
articulate this struggle. Heraclitus saw humankind divided between 
people who struggled to understand themselves and people who did not. 
Yet a closer reading of Heraclitus reveals that this idea is not divisive, 
but unifying. The Few who stnjggle to understand themselves gain the 
insight that they are not separate from the others but bound more 
universally than they suspected before their insight. The logos is 
common. To care for the self, then, is to care for the other. In Heraclitus's 
philosophy, selfishness and selflessness are, paradoxically, one and the 
same. But the selfish turning inward is very different from the shallow, 
egotistic selfishness of the person who lacks an understanding of the 
logos , the person who has not learned the truth that is revealed in self- 
knowledge. This, then, is the broader moral aspect to Heraclitus’s 
thought: knowing the self engenders an understanding that we care for 
the other as we would care for the self.
This paradoxical connection between the self and the other is 
constructive. This is the difference between Heraclitus and modern 
existentialists. In thinkers such a Sartre, the self becomes an inviolable 
entity. Everything, including the other, is hostile to it. The relationship 
between the self and the other is destructive. Sartre's anthropology of 
humankind Is a perversion of reality.
Just as commentators associate Fowles with modern 
existentialism, so too they associate his concept of freedom with the 
freedom of modern existentialists, in particular, Sartre. This is a mistake. 
Sartre's particular ontology generates a radical view of freedom. He 
says in essence, "Man is his freedom,. . .  and therefore his freedom is 
absolute" (Reinhardt 161). This absolute freedom becomes even more
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perverted in his discussion of "l'étre p o u r-a u tru i"being-for-others." In 
the final analysis, either I annihilate the freedom of the other, or they 
annihilate mine. The relationship is therefore not one of love, but of hate 
(162-63).
In light of the obvious differences between Heraclitus's view of 
humankind and Sartre's, and the differences between Fowles's relative 
freedom and Sartre's absolute freedom, it is odd that the association of 
Fowles's very Heraclitean existentialism with Sartre's existentialism 
should have existed as long as it has.
I have tried to show that in the fiction Fowles's freedom is a 
relative freedom and a freedom with responsibility. Fowles makes this 
very plain in an interview with Katherine Tarbox, published as part of her 
book The Art of John Fowles. When asked whether he was interested in 
political freedom, Fowles insisted that freedom must be understood very 
carefully. "The first thing. If you do have a sense of freedom, is that in a 
way it is very limiting. That is, if you gain a sense of freedom and you 
believe in it and wish to act on it, then you realize it puts appalling 
limitations on you" (183). Tarbox then suggests to Fowles that in his 
fiction he seems "to assume that there is some sort of innate goodness or 
right sense about people that will guide their freedom" (184).Fowles's 
answer, in light of my entire argument, is extremely interesting. He says, 
"Freedom for me is inalienably bound up with self-knowledge. I would 
say the two words are almost synonymous in this context.. . .  that's 
certainly how I see political freedom. It's more self-knowledge, and thus 
knowledge of others, too . . . "  (184).
One aspect of my argument has been to say exactly what Fowles 
says above. This sentiment, that self-knowledge engenders a
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knowledge and ultimately a concern for others, cannot be found in much 
of the contemporary existential literature, it is found in the source that 
Fowles has claimed was the genesis of many of his ideas. The Few and 
the Many, the individual and the community, the self and society: the 
earliest attempt to understand these in an existential way is made in 
Heraclitus’s thought.
In The Collector, we saw that Frederick Clegg fails to understand 
his self in any meaningful way. Miranda Richardson, in obvious contrast, 
is a person who makes the inward journey, and is then able to love G.P. 
and reach out to Clegg. In The Maaus. we saw a person much like 
Miranda was before her growth. Nicholas Urfe's hubris, both in his life 
and in his person, is destructive. Through Conchis's Godgame, Nicholas 
is able to undergo the sloughing of his old self and to realize the 
beginning of a new self. By the end of the story, he is able to reach out to 
Alison and understand her word. David Williams is very much like 
Nicholas. He needs to slough his over-rational self and his false 
aestheticism. While he does learn these lessons, I have argued that at 
the close of the novel, he has learned them too well. He sees himself an 
existentially failed man, when, in truth, he has in his decision exemplified 
the ability that Fowles prizes in his characters above all: he has learned 
to balance his new understanding of freedom with a moral responsibility. 
This is the tension that all Fowles's characters exist In. By their example, 
Fowles suggests that we too must learn to understand our selves ever 
better, and by doing so, learn to live equably in this world with others.
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